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ABSTRACT
A VIRTUOUS CYCLE: INTERDEPENDENCE AND THE ONTOGENESIS OF
SOCIAL JUSTICE
SEPTEMBER 2017
NATHAN C. CARNES, B.A., HENDRIX COLLEGE
M.S., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Ronnie Janoff-Bulman
Past research suggests that inequality has been the norm throughout most of human
history (Piketty, 2014) until the shocks of the 20th century—especially mass mobilization
for the world wars—spurred support for progressive public policies around taxation and
social welfare (Scheve & Stasavage, 2010, 2012). The present research investigates why
these collective events activated people’s beliefs about fairness. We propose that these
collective events imbued people with a powerful sense of interdependence, and that this
feeling of interdependence gave motivational force to the belief that group members have
a moral responsibility to share and contribute to the welfare of the group. We test this
link between interdependence and social justice across five studies (N = 1,646) using
diverse methodologies and quantitative techniques. As predicted, our analyses revealed
that social justice is of greater importance in more interdependent groups of everyday life
(Study 1) and for Americans whom feel a stronger sense of interdependence (Study 2). In
fact, manipulating interdependence in well-mixed groups fosters social justice behavior,
which in turn nurtures stronger perceptions of interdependence (Studies 3 – 5). The
implications of this virtuous cycle between interdependence and social justice for social
psychology, public policy, and contemporary events are discussed.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Overview of Present Research
Much of the classic psychological research on social justice neglects one of its
defining characteristics—social justice is something that happens in groups. It is not that
they deny the presence of groups, for distributive justice is fundamentally an accounting
of how goods ought to be distributed in a society (e.g., Deutsch, 1985). It is that other
features of justice are given such weight as to make the social part seem trivial. In this
stream of research, justice is something that depends only on the inherent features of
actions (e.g., Turiel, 1983) or only on the balance of inputs and outputs (e.g., Walster,
Walster, & Bersheid, 1978); it is something that people learn to reason about in a series
of distinct hierarchical stages relatively divorced from social context (e.g., Kohlberg,
1981). However, in the following decades, researchers began to acknowledge the
importance of groups for understanding social justice. In particular, work on procedural
justice emphasizes how relational motives for belonging and respect can drive judgments
of fairness (e.g., Lind & Tyler, 1988). Other work on social identity reveals how selfrelevant ingroups can shape what criterion justice decisions are based on (e.g., Wenzel,
2002), when people are concerned about justice (e.g., Skitka, 2003), and the scope of
justice or who it should and should not apply to (e.g., Clayton & Opotow, 2003).
My dissertation builds on this past work because it connects social justice to the
underlying properties or dynamics of the groups in which it is embedded. I think this
socially embedded approach can help explain when and why groups act on their
members’ convictions about social justice. Chapter 1 of my dissertation provides the
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theoretical background and conceptual questions that underpin the present research. More
specifically, I provide a brief history of inequality by drawing on recent work from
economics and political science to put the present research in context. Then, I integrate
this work with theory and research on morality from social psychology to guide the
questions and hypotheses of my dissertation. Chapters 2 – 6 of my dissertation describe
five studies I have conducted to better understand the group dynamics underlying social
justice. Finally, Chapter 7 of my dissertation discusses the implications of the present
research for our understanding of how inequality is perpetuated and remediated.
A Brief History of Inequality
Injustice takes many forms, but distributional inequality is a pernicious and
enduring example. Piketty (2014) argues that inequality has been the norm throughout
most of human history because it is the natural equilibrium for the distribution of wealth
under historically typical conditions. His thesis is that inequality is a mathematical
certainty when the return on capital exceeds the growth of incomes—barring major
shocks or public policy interventions—because pools of wealth then grow faster than the
economy as a whole. The earliest available data on capital to income ratios—which tell
us something about the value of capital relative to the value of labor—show that this ratio
was about 7:1 in 18th century France and Britain. The earliest available data on
inheritances from 19th century France tell a similar story; the lifetime value of the top 1%
of inheritances was three times larger than the lifetime value of the top 1% of earnings,
meaning that a large inheritance offered the possibility of wealth simply unachievable
through any form of work. In fact, there is evidence that this imbalance between capital
and income characterized economic life stretching back from antiquity until the
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beginning of the 20th century, when the Great Depression and two World Wars seem to
have fostered unprecedented levels of equality in many industrialized nations. Piketty
explains that these shocks destroyed more than half of all past wealth, and progressive
taxation then prevented the wealth of the post-war years from aggregating once again
among the few.
Piketty’s work raises an important and timely question. Evidence from diverse
disciplines suggests that people care about inequality (e.g., Dawes, Fowler, Johnson,
McElreath, & Smirnov, 2007; Tricomi, Rangel, Camerer, & O’Doherty, 2010). In fact,
even children (Shaw & Olson, 2012) and non-human primates (Brosnan & de Waal,
2003) seem to exhibit an aversion to inequality. Furthermore, equal societies are
generally happier, healthier, and wealthier than unequal societies (e.g., Wilkinson &
Pickett, 2009). So why was the middle of the 20th century the only time in the recorded
history of humankind that we taxed the rich more than the rest? Furthermore, why have
so many governments dismantled the progressive public policies of the 20th century and
allowed a seemingly bygone era of radical inequality to return once more (for a review of
rising inequality, see Piketty, Saez, & Zucman, 2016)?
A partial answer to these questions comes from the work of Scheve and
Stasavage, who demonstrate that mass mobilization for warfare had an important effect
on the rise of progressive public policies such as income taxation (2010) and inheritance
taxation (2012; for a review, see Scheve & Stasavage, 2016). They find that progressive
taxation as a government policy depends very little, if at all, on actual levels of
inequality, the establishment of universal suffrage in democratic societies, or how liberal
the political parties and institutions are. Instead, when governments mobilize for war by
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asking tens of millions of their disproportionately younger and poorer citizens to serve in
the military, it activates people’s beliefs about fairness because the burden of the war
effort is unequally shared among different segments of society. Thus, progressive
taxation is seen as fair, even among the wealthiest members of society, because it
compensates for the unequally distributed sacrifices of the war effort. “The conscription
of wealth in the form of progressive taxation constituted part of a new social compact in
which the mass of citizens agreed to fight while the rich agreed to bear a higher tax
burden” (Scheve & Stasavage, 2010, p. 530). However, as the mass mobilization wars of
the 20th century have faded from memory and into history, so too has the resonance of
this compensatory social compact and the progressive public policies for which it laid the
foundation.
The Moral Psychology of Fairness
People’s beliefs about fairness play a pivotal role in how we explain the rise and
fall of both distributional equality and progressive taxation. Despite this critical role,
Scheve and Stasavage (2016) cite only a small sample of behavioral economic studies
suggesting that people have prosocial preferences in addition to self-interested ones. If
we want to understand what these prosocial preferences are and how they work, we
should draw on the rich body of theory and research investigating the psychological
mechanisms that underlie morality in general and fairness in particular. The most
important insight—first proposed in this literature by Brickman, Folger, Goode, and
Schul (1981)—is that there are two qualitatively different kinds of fairness. The basic
idea is that we have a paucity of language with which to describe allocations that we
dislike, we just say something is fair or unfair, but these words can have different
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meanings. For example, consider the debate over affirmative action in which both sides
claim to hold the only fair position. Opponents of affirmative action rely on a moral
principle that Brickman et al. (1981) call microjustice; fairness is an empirical property of
a set of individuals in which inputs like merit determine outputs like admission. In
contrast, proponents of affirmative action rely on a moral principle that Brickman et al.
(1981) call macrojustice; here, fairness is a desirable property of a distribution in which
resources like education are awarded to produce a particular pattern of outcomes like
equal representation.
The labels assigned to microjustice and macrojustice in the literature have
changed over time and between authors. For clarity, I adopt the language prescribed by
Janoff-Bulman and Carnes (2013), who use the terms fairness (i.e., microjustice) and
social justice (i.e., macrojustice). In recent work, my colleagues and I have found support
for making a meaningful distinction between these two constructs. For example, when
participants rate the personal importance of these two moral principles, the items load on
discrete latent factors (Janoff-Bulman & Carnes, 2016a). When participants rate how
applicable these two moral principles are in various groups, we find that fairness and
social justice are used in distinct types of social contexts (Carnes, Lickel, & JanoffBulman, 2015). Moreover, when participants rate how fair and how just different moral
scenarios are, we find that these moral principles are sensitive to different kinds of social
information (Bharadwaj & Janoff-Bulman, in preparation). As will soon become
apparent, this distinction between fairness and social justice is important if we are to
understand why levels of equality and progressive taxation surged only in the middle of
the 20th century.
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Fairness judgments are made within interpersonal contexts and are based on
personal characteristics like deservingness and need (Janoff-Bulman & Carnes, 2013).
Moral Foundations Theory classifies fairness as an individualizing moral principle
because it ascribes value to these personal characteristics, motivating people to care about
the rights of individuals (e.g., Graham et al., 2011; Haidt, 2007; Haidt & Kesebir, 2010).
It is important for people to believe that fairness ought to apply to everyone (Turiel,
1983) and ought to be endorsed by everyone (Mullen & Skitka, 2006) because this helps
groups avoid the risks of both exploitation and infighting (Descioli, 2016; Descioli &
Kurzban, 2013; Thomas, De Freitas, DeScioli, & Pinker, 2016). Put differently, by
protecting the rights of individuals, fairness helps people live together as autonomous
social actors who can cooperate strategically with minimal personal risk (Haidt &
Graham, 2009; Shweder, Much, Mahapatra, & Park, 1997). Thus, this moral principle
emphasizes doing the right thing from a perspective of enlightened self-interest (e.g.,
Haidt, 2012; see also Deutsch, 1985), which fits with the idea that fairness is an
evolutionary product of direct and indirect reciprocity (for a review, see Rand & Nowak,
2013).
In contrast, social justice judgments are made within group contexts and are based
on a priori constraints on the pattern or shape of the distribution (Janoff-Bulman &
Carnes, 2013). The group context is important here, as Wenzel (2000, 2002, 2004)
emphasizes that social justice is more strongly rooted in social identity than enlightened
self-interest. Classic research on social identity suggests that people exhibit a preference
for the ingroup (Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971) because their conception of the
self is intimately tied to the groups they belong to (Tajfel, 1978). These self-relevant
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groups provide norms for what constitutes right behavior (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher,
& Wetherell, 1987) that then guide the actions of members and how they expect others in
the group to perceive them (Ellemers, Pagliaro, Barreto, & Leach, 2008; Pagliaro,
Ellemers, & Barreto, 2011; for a review, see Ellemers & van den Bos, 2012). These
ingroup norms help explain why group members are more likely to help other people in
the group (e.g., Dovidio, 1984; Levine, Cassidy, Brazier, & Reicher, 2002) and cooperate
with fellow group members (e.g., De Cremer & Van Vugt, 1999; Kramer & Brewer,
1984).
Janoff-Bulman and Carnes (2013) argue that social justice promotes moral
behavior by leveraging this group psychology. More specifically, social justice is a
group-based moral principle because it ascribes value to the roles and responsibilities
accompanying group membership, motivating people to care about the welfare of the
group. By committing individuals to the welfare of the group, social justice helps people
live together as members of a cohesive community that can cooperate around their shared
goals and values. Thus, this moral principle emphasizes doing the right thing from a
perspective of parochial altruism (Carnes & Janoff-Bulman, 2016; Janoff-Bulman &
Carnes, 2016b), which fits with the idea that some parts of our moral psychology are the
evolutionary product of group selection (e.g., Haidt, 2012; Richerson & Boyd, 2005;
Wilson, 2012).
It might seem counterintuitive to assert that social justice is somehow parochial or
groupish when past work has linked social justice to inclusive categorization (Rock &
Janoff-Bulman, 2010), political liberalism (Janoff-Bulman & Carnes, 2016a), and
egalitarian social preferences (Janoff-Bulman, Sheikh, & Baldacci, 2008). Indeed,
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Graham et al. (in press) describes social justice as a centrifugal force because it pushes
our circle of moral concern outward to include more distant others as deserving of moral
treatment. One potential answer to this apparent conflict is that groups bound together by
interdependence—by their shared goals and outcomes—might be more inclusive than
groups bound together by a common location, history, or physical characteristic. In fact,
this is what Durkheim (1893/1984) predicted in distinguishing organic solidarity from
mechanical solidarity more than a century ago.
How Convictions Bind Groups
We can think of “morality as the glue that binds” (Haidt, 2008, p. 65). Crediting
Durkheim, Haidt notes, “morality constrains individuals and ties them to each other to
create groups” (2007, p. 1000; for a review of binding morality, see Graham & Haidt,
2010). According to Durkheim (1893/1984), members of a society can be bound together
by their fundamental sameness—possessing shared beliefs, values, and customs—and he
calls this unifying force mechanical solidarity. Carnes and Lickel (under review)
demonstrate that moral principles around hierarchy and authority (e.g., social order) can
indeed foster this sense of sameness, providing group members with a visceral sense of
oneness with the group called identity fusion (for a review of identity fusion, see Swann
& Buhrmester, 2015). However, Durkheim (1893/1984) also argues that members of a
society can be bound together by their complementarity or interdependence, and he calls
this unifying force organic solidarity.
Interestingly, Durkheim (1893/1984) acknowledges that social justice is part of
the collective consciousness or shared beliefs that foster organic solidarity. That is, social
justice is more than a distributional principle; it is a kind of social glue that helps create
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tight-knit groups out of collections of individuals. Psychological research on
entitativity—the degree to which a group is perceived to be a real entity—has found
support for the role of interdependence in binding people together apart from similarity
(e.g., Brewer, Hong, & Li, 2004; Haslam, Rothschild, & Ernst, 2000). Drawing on
Durkheim’s insight, the thesis of my proposed dissertation is that social justice and
interdependence are intimately linked (for a review, see Janoff-Bulman & Carnes, 2013).
I think this link might be able to explain why levels of equality and progressive taxation
surged in the middle of the 20th century.
The great depression and world wars of the last century gave societies a powerful
sense of interdependence or interconnectedness—this feeling that we are all in this
together for better or worse—because citizens became aware of their shared fate in both
economics and conflict. The claim that societies become more communal in difficult
times is supported by recent cross-temporal evidence that individualism swells during
economically prosperous times while interdependence swells during recessionary times
(Bianchi, 2016). The central thrust of my argument is that this feeling of interdependence
gave motivational force to the belief that group members have a moral responsibility to
share and contribute to the welfare of the group. Thus, members of the labor class gave
soldiers to the war effort while members of the capital class gave wealth. Governments
dismantled the progressive public policies of the 20th century because their citizens no
longer felt interdependent; the wars eventually ended, the soldiers came home, and the
prosperous post-war years fed into an upwelling of individualism. I think
interdependence explains the ontogenesis of social justice in large modern societies, and
my proposed dissertation will test this hypothesis using diverse methodologies.
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CHAPTER 2
STUDY 1
Overview
We designed Study 1 to identify how basic group dynamics shape the contextual
importance of different moral principles in daily social life. That is, the primary unit(s) of
analysis in this experiment were the different groups people belong to and not so much
the people themselves. We were particularly interested in the relationship between social
justice and interdependence; our prediction was that social justice would be more
important in more interdependent kinds of groups. That is, organic solidarity should
predict social justice. However, we also assessed the relationship between tightnesslooseness and social order. Tight groups have strong norms and low tolerance for deviant
behavior, whereas loose groups have weak norms and high tolerance for deviant behavior
(e.g., Gelfand et al., 2011); in other words, tight groups have homogenous beliefs and
values. We predicted that to maintain such tight cohesion, groups would need moral
values around authority, hierarchy, and tradition to enforce and maintain conformity.
That is, mechanical solidarity should predict social order.
Method
Participants. We recruited 99 participants from the University of Massachusetts
Amherst subject pool in exchange for extra credit (8.1% male; median age of 20). A
majority of the participants identified as White (62.6%), and the remaining identified as
Asian (17.2%), Black (4%), Hispanic (3%), or nominated another racial category (8%).
No participants were excluded from analysis. A power analysis revealed that this sample
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had sufficient power (ρ = .80) under realistic assumptions to detect a medium to small
effect of our principal hypothesis (δ = .36) (see Raudenbush et al., 2011).
Procedure. After reading detailed directions, participants completed the group
listing task to generate self-relevant target groups. These groups were then piped into the
group rating task, which asked participants to rate each target group along several
dimensions. At the end of the experiment, participants completed the social value
orientation measure and demographics, including political orientation.
Group Listing Task. We asked participants to think about the rich variety of
groups they belong to, and we gave them some guidance to help get them started. We
suggested that, “you might think of yourself as a member of a family, part of a university,
a citizen of a country, having a particular race, gender, or religion, or even being in a
group of strangers in an experiment.” Participants then typed a list of 12 different groups
they belong to now or sometime in the past. This generated an array of socially in vivo
groups that were self-relevant to the participant. For example, one typical participant’s
anonymized list of groups included: family, university student, school friends, home
friends, church, citizen of USA, employee of restaurant, female, Caucasian, member of
experiment, resident of Massachusetts, and psychology major.
Group Rating Task. Participants rated the 12 target groups from the group listing
task on 12 dimensions, one dimension at a time, following the procedure developed by
Lickel et al. (2000; see also Carnes et al., 2015). Each dimension was presented in a
randomized order and assessed on a 7-point rating scale using item-specific anchors.
Interdependence (α = .826), tightness-looseness (α = .745), social justice (α = .825), and
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social order (α = .626) were sufficiently reliable across all groups when measured with
three items each (see Appendix A for items).
Social Value Orientation Measure. This 9-item measure, originally developed by
Van Lange (1999), asks participants to choose among three hypothetical distributions
between the self and an anonymous other person. One option is prosocial (maximizing
joint payoffs), another option is egoistic (maximizing one’s absolute payoff), and the
final option is competitive (maximizing one’s relative payoff). Our sample was 54.5%
prosocial, 24.2% egoistic, 10.1% competitive, and the remainder was inconsistent1.
Political Orientation Measure. Participants rated two items using 7-point scales
anchored from very liberal/strong democrat (1) to very conservative/strong republican
(7). These items were sufficiently reliable (r(97) = .702).
Results
We analyzed the data using hierarchical linear modeling with full maximum
likelihood estimation because the data had a nested structure with two levels (e.g.,
observations nested within persons). That is, the level-1 units were the different group
targets that participants rated (i.e., observations), while the level-2 units were the
individuals making the ratings (i.e., persons).
We first calculated the intraclass correlation2 for each of the four measured
dimensions to assess the proportion of variance that lies between group targets versus
raters. We ran four one-way ANOVAs with random effects in which each dimension was
a separate outcome to generate four intraclass correlations. This analysis revealed that a
majority of the variance in interdependence (84.15%), tightness-looseness (77.77%),
social justice (75.89%), and social order (72.44%) was due to differences between group
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targets; the remainder, about 22.44% on average, was due to differences between
individual raters.
We then assessed the relationship between the group property dimensions and the
moral principle dimensions. We ran two random-coefficient regression models in which
interdependence and tightness-looseness were the predictors3 and either social justice or
social order were the outcome. Our analyses revealed that interdependence strongly
predicted social justice (γ = .79, SE = .024, t(98) = 33.45, p < .001), whereas tightnesslooseness was only a weak predictor (γ = .070, SE = .030, t(98) = 2.37, p = .020). In fact,
a multivariate contrast revealed that interdependence was a significantly stronger
predictor (χ2(1) = 248.95, p < .001) and alone accounted for 71.62% of the level-1
variance in social justice. In contrast, tightness-looseness strongly predicted social order
(γ = .54, SE = .030, t(98) = 17.89, p < .001), while interdependence was only a weak
predictor (γ = .17, SE = .028, t(98) = 6.07, p < .001). A multivariate contrast revealed that
tightness-looseness was a significantly stronger predictor (χ2(1) = 61.43, p < .001) and
alone accounted for 46.25% of the level-1 variance in social order.
Finally, we investigated whether individual differences in politics or social value
orientation moderate these relationships. We ran two intercepts-and-slopes-as-outcomes
models in which politics and social value orientation were added as predictors to the prior
models. These individual differences did not improve model fit to the observed data when
predicting social justice scores (Δχ2(6) = 4.66, p = .588), suggesting no moderation, but
provided a marginal improvement in model fit when predicting social order scores
(Δχ2(6) = 11.43, p = .076). A closer inspection of the parameter estimates in this model
revealed that social value orientation moderated the relationship between tightness-
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looseness and social order (γ = .15, SE = .058, t(85) = 2.57, p = .012) such that this
relationship was stronger for those with a proself rather than prosocial orientation4.
Discussion
As predicted, social justice was more important in interdependent groups while
social order was more important in tighter groups. These relationships had very large
effect sizes, explaining almost 60% of the variance in morality on average, and did not
appear to be moderated by politics. This is particularly interesting in light of extensive
past research showing that conservatives endorse social order while liberals endorse
social justice (e.g., Janoff-Bulman & Carnes, 2016; Janoff-Bulman et al., 2008).
However, the relationship between social order and tightness-looseness was moderated
by social value orientation; essentially, those who were more selfish thought that more
constraints on self-interest were required to maintain tight groups.
Moreover, groups had a dominant effect on morality relative to individual
differences, as indicated by the intraclass correlation, which replicates past research using
this methodological approach (see Carnes et al., 2015). This suggests that group
dynamics play an important role in guiding moral convictions, but that some group
properties (e.g., interdependence) might have a unique relationship with some moral
principles (e.g., social justice). We further explored this potentially important relationship
between group dynamics and moral convictions in Study 2.
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Notes
1

We followed the convention, established by Van Lange and colleagues, of collapsing

egoistic and competitive participants into a single category and dropping inconsistent
participants for analyses with this construct.
2

HLM calculates an intraclass correlation that quantifies the proportion of variance in an

outcome variable that is between the level-2 units by dividing the level-2 variance
component by the sum of both the level-1 and level-2 variance components (see
Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002).
3

Both predictors were group-mean centered because our primary research question

involved the relationships at level-1 (see Enders & Tofighi, 2007). All random effects
were included in the model.
4

There was not a significant effect of the remaining parameter estimates (all p ≥ .112).
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CHAPTER 3
STUDY 2
Overview
We designed Study 2 to replicate and extend the findings of Study 1 while
leveraging an alternative methodological approach. More specifically, we examined the
relationship between group properties and moral principles for a single identity—
Americans—rather than across the many groups of daily social life. Furthermore, we
hoped to better infer the direction of this relationship by experimentally manipulating
participants’ sense of solidarity with other Americans.
We made a theoretical distinction between social justice—this sense of moral
responsibility to the disadvantaged or the group writ large—and explicit support for
equality in this study. This helped us unpack the psychological process linking
interdependence with equality. We also assessed how inclusive people feel about other
groups of humans, and even plants or animals, to test whether interdependence implies a
parochialism that is less tribal and more global.
Method
Participants. We recruited 671 participants on Amazon Mechanical Turk via
TurkPrime in exchange for payment (39.88% male; median age of 32) (see Litman,
Robinson, & Abberbock, 2016). A majority of the participants identified as White
(73.96%), and the remaining identified as Asian (5.66%), Black (9.67%), Hispanic
(4.61%), or nominated another racial category (6.10%). We excluded 47 participants
(7%) based on an American identity check, a manipulation check, and two catch
questions designed to identify careless responders. The 624 included participants should
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provide sufficient power to test our predicted multigroup structural equation model (45
estimated parameters) as well as alternative models, and the covariance matrices should
provide sufficient information for this model to be identified.
Procedure. We randomly assigned each participant to one of two experimental
manipulations (weak solidarity or strong solidarity) which involved a prompted writing
task. Next, participants completed the group measures, the morality measures, the
equality measures, and the inclusion measures in that order. We assessed demographics,
including socioeconomic status, at the end of the experiment.
Experimental Manipulations. In both conditions, we first explained how “the
social fabric of a community is a metaphor for the quality or closeness of relationships in
that community.” Participants randomly assigned to the weak solidarity condition wrote
about “some of the ways in which America's social fabric has gotten weaker since the
presidential election (even if you think it has gotten stronger in other ways)” for at least
two minutes. Participants randomly assigned to the strong solidarity condition wrote
about “some of the ways in which America's social fabric has gotten stronger since the
presidential election (even if you think it has gotten weaker in other ways)” for at least
two minutes. A coder read these essays to ensure participants responded to the prompt.
Group Measures. Identity fusion (α = .924) and interdependence (α = .882) were
each measured with eight items presented in counterbalanced order. These items were all
rated on a 7-point scale anchored from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (7). To
measure identity fusion, we added an item to the identity fusion scale (Gómez et al.,
2011). This item is: “I am nothing without my country.” We developed and pilot tested
the interdependence items for this study based on past research5 (see Appendix A for

17

items). For analysis, we created four parcels for each construct. We used the item to
construct balance approach for identity fusion and the a priori questionnaire construction
approach for interdependence (see Little, Cunningham, Shahar, & Widaman, 2002).
Morality Measures. Social justice (α = .907) and social order (α = .897) were each
measured with six items presented in counterbalanced order. Participants rated these
items on a 7-point scale anchored from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (7). These
items were adapted from Janoff-Bulman and Carnes (2016a) as well as the group rating
task from Study 1 (see Appendix A for items). We used the item to construct balance
approach to generate three parcels for each of these constructs.
Equality Measures. Equality was measured with three indicators: a 4-item selfreport measure and two rating tasks presented in counterbalanced order (see Appendix A
for self-report items). Participants rated these self-report items on a 7-point scale
anchored from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (7). These self-report items were
adequately reliable (α = .874) so their composite acted as an indicator of equality. The
first rating task presented participants with two bar charts depicting Black pay relative to
White pay (65%) and female pay relative to male pay (80%). We asked participants to
“imagine that you could decide how much (Black people/females) earn if you had control
over the matter.” Participants could manipulate the bar chart to indicate their preference.
We created a single dummy variable indicating whether Black people and females should
earn 100% of the pay of their counterparts. The second rating task presented participants
with a bar chart depicting wealth inequality by quintile with the top 20% controlling 88%
of all wealth. We asked participants to “imagine that you could decide how our country’s
wealth should be distributed if you had control over the matter.” Participants could
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manipulate the bar chart to indicate their preference. The Gini index of these wealth
quintiles acted as the third and final indicator of equality6.
Inclusion Measures. Inclusion was measured with two indicators: a subscale of
the identification with all humanity scale (McFarland, Brown, & Webb, 2013) and the
moral expansiveness scale (Crimston, Bain, Hornsey, & Bastian, 2016) presented in
counterbalanced order. The identification with all humanity scale has nine items rated on
a 5-point scale with item-specific anchors. Shortening the original scale, we only had
participants rate “Americans” (α = .925) and “people all over the world” (α = .921). An
example item is: “How close do you feel to each of the following groups?” We did not
analyze the “Americans” version of the scale. The moral expansiveness scale asks
participants to rate 24 targets7 on a 4-point scale anchored from outside the moral
boundary (1) to inner circle of moral concern (4). Example targets include: family
member, dolphin, murderer, old-growth forest, and refugee.
Socioeconomic Status Measure. Participants answered two questions by entering
values into numeric boxes. These questions asked about years of education and
household income last year8.
Results
We tested a multigroup structural equation model in LISREL 8.80 using full
maximum likelihood estimation. We used a multigroup framework—with the groups
being the strong solidarity and weak solidarity conditions—because this allowed us to
test for moderation by our experimental manipulation. We predicted that interdependence
would be positively associated with social justice while identity fusion would be
positively associated with social order, and that these relationships would increase in
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strength in the strong solidarity condition relative to the weak solidarity condition. We
also predicted that social justice would be associated with greater support for equality and
inclusion whereas social order would not. These predictions were made a priori and
preregistered using the Open Science Framework (osf.io/34k4q).
Our baseline model, shown conceptually in the figure below, included 43
estimated parameters that were all held equivalent between the two groups. This included
19 error variances, 13 factor loadings, 2 factor variances, 4 disturbance variances, 6
paths, 2 disturbance covariances, and 1 factor covariance. The estimation process for this
model converged on an admissible solution, and although the model chi-square was
significant (χ²(333) = 879.26, p < .001)9, the values for the other recommended fit indices
were acceptable (RMSEA = .071, CFI = .963, SRMR1 = .094, SRMR2 = .114).

Figure 1: Conceptual Diagram of Predicted Model
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Before testing for moderation, we investigated whether the model could be
improved by estimating additional paths between latent constructs. A model with the
interdependence to social order and identity fusion to social justice paths was a
significantly better fit to the observed data than the baseline model (Δχ2(2) = 39.07, p <
.001). We found that controlling for these unpredicted paths increased the predictive
validity of our predicted paths. That is, controlling for identity fusion strengthened the
relationship between interdependence and social justice, whereas controlling for
interdependence strengthened the relationship between identity fusion and social order.
Therefore, we included these additional paths in all subsequent models.
We also investigated whether all of the effects associated with morality are
necessary; it is possible that the effect of social justice or social order alone sufficiently
accounts for equality and inclusion. We tested two alternative models in which we
trimmed the paths from social justice or social order to equality and inclusion.
Interestingly, a model without the effects of social justice (Δχ2(2) = 356.74, p < .001) or
social order (Δχ2(2) = 95.25, p < .001) was a significantly worse fit to the observed data.
This suggests that these relationships are, in fact, important.
Next, we tested for moderation by experimental condition. We did not expect the
measurement equations (e.g., error variances and factor loadings) to vary between
experimental conditions, but a model in which we allowed these parameters to vary
between groups was a significantly better fit to the observed data (Δχ2(32) = 77.18, p <
.001). We tested a series of models to identify whether some or all of these measurement
equations were moderated by the experimental manipulation. Our analyses revealed that a
model with variant measurement for interdependence, social justice, and equality was a

21

significantly better fit to the observed data (Δχ2(17) = 61.69, p < .001). In contrast, a
model with variant measurement for identity fusion, social order, and inclusion was not a
significantly better fit to the observed data (Δχ2(15) = 15.76, p = .399). We retained
variant measurement for interdependence, social justice, and equality in subsequent
models because it is important to account for differential item functioning.
We then tested for the predicted moderation effect by allowing the paths from
interdependence to social justice and identity fusion to social order to vary between
experimental conditions. We also allowed the following associated parameters to vary
between groups: the variance of interdependence, the variance of identity fusion, the
disturbance variance of social justice, the disturbance variance of social order, the
covariance between interdependence and identity fusion, and the disturbance covariance
between social justice and social order. This model was a significantly better fit to the
observed data than the model with only variant measurement (Δχ2(8) = 30.13, p < .001),
which suggests that the experimental manipulation moderated these predicted paths.
We also tested a series of alternative models in which we allowed unpredicted
paths to vary between experimental conditions against the prior predicted model. A
model with variant paths from interdependence to social order and identity fusion to
social justice was not a significantly better fit to the observed data (Δχ2(2) = 2.69, p =
.261). Nor were models with variant effects emanating from social justice (Δχ2(5) = 2.62,
p = .758) or social order (Δχ2(5) = 5.08, p = .406). This suggests that the experimental
manipulation did not moderate these other relationships.
As can be seen in Table 1 (see Appendix B), our best fitting model had partially
variant measurement, added paths from interdependence to social order and identity
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fusion to social justice, and variant paths from interdependence to social justice and
identity fusion to social order. Although the model chi-square was significant (χ²(306) =
748.37, p < .001), the values for the other recommended fit indices were pretty good
(RMSEA = .066, CFI = .970, SRMR1 = .077, SRMR2 = .076). We tested a variety of
nested alternative models to get this final model, but we also wanted to test a non-nested
alternative model. It is possible that group dynamics are the most proximate to our
outcome variables of equality and inclusion, and that morality is actually the antecedent
driving how people feel about the group. We tested a model that was structurally similar
to our best fitting model, except we switched interdependence with social justice and
identity fusion with social order. However, this alternative model appeared to be a much
worse fit to the observed data (AIC = 1307.44) relative to our final model (AIC = 864.27).
We retained our final best fitting model, and not this alternative model, for analysis.
An inspection of the parameter estimates revealed that all of our predictions were
supported (for factor parameters, see Table 2 in Appendix B; for indicator parameters,
see Table 3 in Appendix B). Interdependence was positively associated with social justice
but did not predict social order. In contrast, identity fusion was positively associated with
social order and had a weak, negative association with social justice. Critically, the
experimental manipulation of solidarity strengthened both of these relationships. The
moderation of social justice appeared to be stronger, as these predictors explained more
of the variance in social justice in the strong solidarity condition (27.67%) relative to the
weak solidarity condition (12.76%). These predictors explained only a little more of the
variance in social order in the strong solidarity condition (58.35%) relative to the weak
solidarity condition (52.40%).
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Social justice was a very strong, positive predictor of both equality and inclusion,
whereas social order was a weak, negative predictor. In fact, morality explained an
impressive 69.14% of the variance in equality and 46.46% of the variance in inclusion
averaging across experimental conditions. Finally, our analyses revealed that there was a
significant total indirect effect of interdependence on both equality (b = .602, SE = .079, t
= 7.62, p < .001) and inclusion (b = .416, SE = .061, t = 6.86, p < .001) mediated through
morality in the strong solidarity condition. These indirect effect on equality (b = .297, SE
= .074, t = 4.01, p < .001) and inclusion (b = .204, SE = .051, t = 3.98, p < .001) were
smaller but still significant in the weak solidarity condition. All of these effects can be
seen in the figures below, which depict the unstandardized parameter estimates in both
the strong solidarity and weak solidarity conditons.

Figure 2: Unstandardized Structural Model in the Strong Solidarity Condition
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Figure 3: Unstandardized Structural Model in the Weak Solidarity Condition
Discussion
As predicted, interdependence was positively associated with social justice while
identity fusion was positively associated with social order. This conceptually replicates
our Study 1 findings in an intragroup context (as opposed to an intergroup context).
Additionally, the powerful relationship between identity fusion and social order replicates
past research with these constructs (see Carnes & Lickel, under review). Interestingly,
our experimental manipulation of solidarity caused these relationships to grow stronger,
but had no effect on other relationships. As theorized in past work, both social justice and
social order appear to be binding moral principles that rely on different group properties
to unify people (see Janoff-Bulman & Carnes, 2013).
A particular strength of this study was the use of multiple indicators and latent
analytic methods to assess how people feel about equality and inclusion. As can be seen
in Table 3, these different measures appeared to be valid and (mostly) reliable indicators
of their respective latent constructs. Social justice was a strong predictor of support for
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equality, and there was indeed a robust indirect effect of interdependence on equality
through morality. Despite its parochial roots, social justice also predicted greater
inclusivity (with its indicators of identification with all of humanity and an expansive
circle of moral regard). In contrast to social justice, social order had independent,
negative effects on support for equality and inclusion. One might not expect social order
to have independent effects on these particular outcome variables, but the direction of
these effects was sensible. In the next study, we further explored these relationships with
real behaviors.
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Notes
5

These items emphasize common goals, shared interests, mutual dependence, and

common fate based on past work on entitativity (e.g., Brewer, Hong, & Li, 2004),
solidarity (e.g., Durkheim, 1893/1984), and interdependence theory (e.g., Kelley et al.,
2003). These items were sufficiently reliable in a pilot study (α = .877).
6

The Gini index is a measure of equality bounded between zero (perfect equality) and

one (perfect inequality). The Gini index is the average absolute difference between all
pairs of individuals divided by twice the mean, or equivalently it is twice the area
between the Lorenz curve and the line of perfect equality (Allison, 1978).
7

We removed the following targets: U.S. president, U.S. soldier, charity worker, chicken,

fish, bee, redwood tree, apple tree, rose bush. We added the following targets:
undocumented immigrant, person of different race, welfare recipient. The wording of
some targets was slightly revised (e.g., intellectually disabled person instead of mentally
challenged person).
8

We excluded these covariates from analysis for the time being because the questions

(and answers) are somewhat ambiguous. Participants described their income (ones versus
thousands) and education (total versus after high school) in different metrics. We can
infer what many participants meant and recode their responses, but the more ambiguous
answers may have to be deleted.
9

It is common for models with large samples or multigroup designs to have significant

chi-square values even if the model fits the observed data (Kline, 2015).
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CHAPTER 4
STUDY 3
Overview
We designed Study 3 to replicate and extend the findings of the prior two studies
using yet another methodological approach. More specifically, we wanted to study the
relationship between group dynamics and moral principles in the controlled setting of the
lab with experimentally contrived groups. Behavioral economic games provide an ideal
vehicle to test this question because the group is small enough to influence underlying
group dynamics, and behavior in the game might represent morality in action. The
essence of social justice is a concern for the welfare of the group, which clearly fits with
the definition of cooperation—to pay a personal cost to produce a collective benefit (e.g.,
Rand & Nowak, 2013). Similarly, the essence of social order is a concern for conformity
and obedience in the group, which clearly fits with the definition of coordination—to
match or potentially mismatch on the actions of others (e.g., Thomas, DeScioli, Haque, &
Pinker, 2014). Therefore, we asked participants to play a public goods game (i.e., a
cooperation problem) and a matching game (i.e., a coordination problem) to assess moral
behavior in real social groups.
An especially novel contribution of this study is our experimental manipulation of
interdependence in which participants’ payoffs were randomly shuffled at the end of the
game. In effect, participants in this condition were actually interdependent because their
outcomes in the game depended just as much on the behavior of others as themselves.
Interestingly, this echoes Rawls’ (1971/2009) original position wherein members of a
society must decide how to organize the distribution of rights and resources behind a
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“veil of ignorance” (i.e., without knowing their ultimate position or status in society). We
also experimentally manipulated the norms in each game using a more typical external
assignment condition (e.g., Van Huyck, Gillette, & Battalio, 1992) that told participants
what to do. Our prediction was that the interdependence manipulation would promote
cooperation (i.e., social justice) and the norm manipulation would promote coordination
(i.e., social order).
Method
Participants. We recruited 249 participants from the University of Massachusetts
Amherst subject pool in exchange for extra credit and prizes (28.5% male; median age of
20). A majority of the participants identified as White (66.7%), and the remaining
identified as Asian (15.9%), Black (6%), Hispanic (4%), Multiracial (3.2%), or
nominated another racial category (3.2%). No participants were excluded from analysis.
A power analysis revealed that this sample had sufficient power (ρ = .80) under realistic
assumptions to detect a medium to small effect of our principal hypothesis (δ = .31) (see
Raudenbush et al., 2011).
Procedure. Participants completed the experiment in groups of three to five people
sitting at separated desks facing a wall. We randomly assigned these groups to one of
three experimental manipulations (control, norm, or interdependence) and then
participants played the public goods game and the matching game in counterbalanced
order. These economic games were conducted using the z-Tree software package
(Fischbacher, 2007). Participants read detailed directions10 about each of these games
immediately before playing. The experimenter read additional directions to the group
depending on their experimental condition, and confirmed that each participant
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understood the rules prior to beginning. Participants could exchange points earned in the
economic games for a tiered system of prizes including candy, novelties (e.g., Frisbees,
sunglasses, etc.), or a raffle for one of several $50 gift cards11. After playing both
economic games, participants completed the morality measure and demographics,
including checks on understanding and familiarity12.
Experimental Manipulations. We randomly assigned each group of participants to
the control condition, the norm condition, or the interdependence condition. In the control
condition, the experimenter did not provide extra directions about the game; however, the
experimenter read additional directions aloud before each game in the other two
conditions (see Appendix A for manipulations). In the norm condition, the experimenter
explained that there was an informal rule in the public goods game to contribute most of
their endowment, and an informal rule in the matching game to pick the middle number;
this norm tells participants “what most people should do in the game.” In the
interdependence condition, the experimenter explained that he or she would randomly
shuffle participants’ final payoffs at the end of the experiment; this rule tells participants
that they “are just as likely to get someone else’s payoffs as their own.”
Public Goods Game. Each player received an endowment of 20 points, and could
contribute any amount of that endowment to the common pool. All contributions to the
common pool were increased by an efficiency factor of 1.6 and divided equally among
the players. Players could see how much they had contributed, how much they had
earned, and how much other players had contributed in each round; however, players
could not identify which actual person was associated with which player number.
Participants played 13 rounds, including one for practice. The directions framed the game
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as “an example of a generic situation in which a group of people can try to achieve a
common goal, but people in the group have the option of only benefitting themselves.”
The primary outcome variable in this game was the number of points each player
contributed to the common pool.
Matching Game. Each player could pick any number between one and seven.
Everyone earned 32 points if all players matched on the same number; otherwise, no one
earned any points. Players could see what number they had picked, how much they had
earned, and what number other players had picked in each round; however, players could
not identify which actual person was associated with which player number. Participants
played 13 rounds, including one for practice. The directions framed the game as “an
example of a generic situation in which a group of people are trying to reach the same
outcome, but people in the group don't yet know how to get there.” The primary outcome
variable in this game was a dummy code indicating whether each player matched the
median number selected in the group.
Morality Measure. We measured social justice (α = .819) and social order (α =
.715) with five items each (see appendix A for items), which were presented in
counterbalanced order on a single page. Participants rated these items using 7-point
scales anchored from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (7). This measure was
adapted from Janoff-Bulman and Carnes (2016a).
Results
We analyzed the data using hierarchical linear modeling because the data had a
nested structure with three levels (e.g., observations nested within individuals nested
within groups). That is, the level-1 units were the decisions participants made in the
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games across 12 rounds of play (i.e., observations), the level-2 units were the individuals
making the decisions (i.e., individuals), and the level-3 units were the experimental
groups that participants played the games in (i.e., groups). We used full maximum
likelihood estimation for the public goods game data and adaptive Gaussian quadrature
for the matching game data.
Public Goods Game
We first calculated the intraclass correlation for contributions to the common pool
to assess the proportion of variance that lies between observations, individuals, and
groups. This is similar to the procedure in Study 1, but with three levels of nesting (see
Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). An unconditional model with random intercepts revealed
that differences between observations—representing the underlying dynamics of the
game itself—account for about half of the variance in contributions (50.42%). The rest of
the variance, however, lies between both individuals (28.65%) and groups (20.93%).
Next, we estimated participants’ baseline behavior in the game by including the
round of play (1 – 12) as a level-1 linear predictor with random slopes at both level-2 and
level-3. We also included understanding, familiarity, group size, and game order as
covariates13. A participant in a typical group contributed 12.20 points (SE = .63, t(59) =
19.25, p < .001) to the common pool in round one, but there was a significant amount of
variation around this intercept at the individual level and the group level (all p < .001).
These contributions declined over the course of the game (γ = -.33, SE = .079, t(59) = 4.22, p < .001), but there was again significant variation around this slope at the
individual level and the group level (all p < .001).
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We then added social justice and social order as grand-mean centered level-2
predictors to test whether these individual differences affect cooperation14. The model
revealed that while social justice was associated with marginally higher initial
contributions (γ = .52, SE = .29, t(117) = 1.78, p = .077), social order was not (γ = .23, SE
= .31, t(117) = .75, p = .454). Furthermore, social justice attenuated the decline in
contributions over time (γ = .081, SE = .032, t(117) = 2.51, p = .013), while social order
did not (γ = -.014, SE = .034, t(117) = -.42, p = .673). These individual differences
improved model fit (Δχ2(4) = 20.43, p < .001), explaining 3.00% of the variance in the
initial intercept, 10.68% of the variance in the endgame intercept, and 6.75% of the
variance in the slope at level-2.
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Figure 4: Effect of Social Justice on Cooperation.
Finally, we added the experimental manipulations as level-3 predictors to test
whether these group dynamics affect cooperation (see Appendix C for this model’s
equation). The model revealed that initial contributions were marginally higher in the
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norm condition (γ = 2.02, SE = 1.01, t(57) = 1.99, p = .052) relative to the control
condition, but were not significantly different in the interdependence condition (γ = 1.43,
SE = 1.02, t(57) = .87, p = .169). In contrast, the decline in contributions over time was
significantly attenuated in the interdependence condition (γ = .26, SE = .13, t(57) = 2.05,
p = .045) relative to the control condition, but was not significantly attenuated in the
norm condition (γ = .12, SE = .13, t(57) = .93, p = .359). These experimental
manipulations improved model fit (Δχ2(4) = 9.61, p = .047) and had a bigger effect size,
explaining 13.43% of the variance in the initial intercept, 18.77% of the variance in the
endgame intercept, and 11.20% of the variance in the slope at level-3.
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Figure 5: Effect of the Experimental Manipulations on Cooperation.
Matching Game
We used a logit link function to represent the likelihood of matching because the
outcome variable was nominal. We first calculated the intraclass correlation for the
likelihood of matching to assess the proportion of variance that lies between individuals

34

and groups. An unconditional model with random intercepts revealed that differences
between groups accounted for most of the variance (82.29%) while differences between
individuals accounted for a relatively small share of the variance (17.71%)15.
Next, we estimated participants’ baseline performance in the game by including
the round of play (1 – 12) as a level-1 linear predictor with random slopes at both level-2
and level-3. We also included understanding, familiarity, group size, and game order as
covariates16. A participant in a typical group matched the median number picked 51.91%
of the time in round one (γ = .036, SE = .38, t(59) = .096, p = .924), but there was
significant variation around this intercept at both the individual level and the group level
(p ≤ .016). In addition, the likelihood of matching increased each round (γ = .57, SE =
.093, t(59) = 6.10, p < .001), but there was significant variation around this slope at the
group level (p < .001) and not at the individual level (p > .500).
We then added social order and social justice as grand-mean centered level-2
predictors to test whether these individual differences affect coordination17. Surprisingly,
the model revealed that social justice was associated with marginally higher chances of
matching in round one (γ = .25, SE = .14, t(117) = 1.73, p = .086). There was also a
trending effect of social order on the likelihood of matching over time (γ = .040, SE =
.030, t(117) = 1.40, p = .164), but the remaining effects were not significant (all p ≥
.348). These individual differences explained 4.01% of the level-2 variance in matching
when assessed at the beginning of the game.
Finally, we added the experimental manipulations as level-3 predictors to test
whether group dynamics affect coordination (see Appendix C for this model’s equation).
A participant in a typical group in the norm condition matched 77.65% of the time in
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round one, which was significantly more than the 35.23% chance in the control condition
(γ = 1.85, SE = .62, t(57) = 2.99, p = .004) and the 35.08% chance in the interdependence
condition (γ = 1.86, SE = .61, t(57) = 3.07, p = .003). The likelihood of matching
increased over time in all three conditions, but this rate was trending slower in both the
norm condition (γ = -.25, SE = .15, t(57) = -1.69, p = .096) and the interdependence
condition (γ = -.21, SE = .14, t(57) = -1.47, p = .146) relative to the control condition.
These experimental manipulations explained 20.88% of the level-3 variance in matching
when assessed at the beginning of the game.
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Figure 6: Effect of the Experimental Manipulations on Coordination.
Discussion
Our experimental manipulations were designed to simulate different group
dynamics, and they had the predicted effects on moral behavior. Interdependence
sustained cooperation over time in the public goods game and norms initiated
coordination in the matching game. This conceptually replicates the findings from
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Studies 1 and 2 using very different operationalizations, and allows us to make causal
arguments because we had random assignment to experimental condition. We also found
that self-reported endorsement of social justice predicted higher initial levels of
cooperation and more sustained cooperation over time. It is interesting that attitudes
about social justice in a societal context would generalize to behavior in a small group
context, but the fact that they did strengthens our claim that cooperation is a form of
social justice in action.
Our findings also illustrate an important point about enacting social justice. One
might be tempted to impose social justice on a group by simply telling people what to do.
However, this is precisely what we did in the norm condition, and although initial levels
of cooperation improved, contributions to the common pool still collapsed over the
course of the game just as in the control condition. This suggests that simply telling
people to share or help might be an ineffective strategy; we need to build community and
strengthen the underlying connections between people if we want to promote social
justice over the long haul. Social justice is not simply an abstract moral principle; it is
embedded in the structure or character of groups (see Carnes et al., 2015).
Interestingly, imposing a “veil of ignorance” (i.e., the interdependence
manipulation) promoted our operationalization of social justice in the public goods game.
The logic of Rawls’ (1971/2009) thought experiment uses self-interest against itself—
what would a reasonable person do if they cannot privilege their group or themselves?
Structure society based on the principles of equality and justice so that it benefits the least
advantaged members. Our manipulation worked in a similar manner, structuring the
incentives of the game so that self-interest serves the common interest, but we note that
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the original position also makes people interdependent. As Rawls might have predicted,
the proportion of truly cooperative 20-point contributions rose from 19.8% in the control
condition to 35.2% in the interdependence condition (and 26.8% in the norm condition).
There were, however, some problems with this study. First, many of the effects
were relatively modest in their level of significance and size, suggesting that we need to
replicate our findings. Second, there was a strong order effect wherein participants
cooperated less and matched more in their second game. This suggests that our
replication should include only one economic game. Third, based on participants’ selfreported understanding, it was also clear that the directions could be made clearer in this
replication study. It is important that participants understand the social problem
confronting them in order for their moral behavior to be inferentially valid. Finally, we
need more measures of psychological process to complete the conceptual leap from our
first set of studies to our second set of studies. We give labels to our experimental
manipulations, but we need evidence that they induce the psychological processes
predicted from theory. We implemented these changes in Study 4.

Notes
10

The directions described the rules for each game using neutral, simple language as is

typical in the literature. We also provided a table of potential payoffs to illustrate how
players’ choices interact to determine the outcome of the games. In the public goods
game, this table showed that “you earn more points when the common pool is larger.
However, you can also earn more points by keeping more of your own endowment. The
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same is true for all of the other players.” In the matching game, this table showed that
“you only earn points by matching on any of the seven numbers. You do not get any
points if you fail to match on a number. The same is true for all of the other players.”
11

Past research suggests that increasing stakes, even up to several months’ wages, has a

surprisingly weak effect on behavior in economic games (e.g., Cameron, 1999; List &
Cherry, 2000; Slonim & Roth, 1998).
12

Most participants were unfamiliar with economic games (85.1%), but understood the

public goods game (89.2%) and the matching game (98%).
13

We included these variables as covariates, rather than cutting participants, for power

reasons. No random effects were added for any covariates. Covariates were centered so
that the intercepts represented individuals in 4-person groups who played the public
goods game first, understood the game, and were not familiar with it from before.
Participants’ initial contributions were smaller when they played the public goods game
second (γ = -3.05, SE = .87, t(59) = -3.53, p < .001) or did not understand the game (γ = 2.52, SE = 1.07, t(121) = -2.34, p = .021). These covariates did not have any additional
significant effects (all p ≥ .137).
14

We did not include random effects for these variables because they should theoretically

reflect individual differences.
15

We cannot calculate the proportion of variance between level-1 units with this

estimation method.
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16

We included these variables as covariates, rather than cutting participants, for power

reasons. No random effects were added for any covariates. Covariates were centered so
that the intercepts represented individuals in 4-person groups who played the matching
game first, understood the game, and were not familiar with it from before. Participants
were 38.39% more likely to match in round one when playing the matching game second
(γ = 2.09, SE = .56, t(59) = 3.75, p < .001), and were marginally more likely to match as
the rounds progressed when they were familiar with economic games (γ = .18, SE = .099,
t(121) = 1.79, p = .076). These covariates did not have any additional significant effects
(all p ≥ .313).
17

We did not include random effects for these variables because they should theoretically

reflect individual differences.
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CHAPTER 5
STUDY 4
Overview
We designed Study 4 to overcome the methodological problems identified in
Study 3; participants only played one economic game (i.e., the public goods game), we
clarified the directions for this game, and we added more psychological measures. We
also replaced the norm condition with a novel experimental manipulation of prosociality.
Participants in this condition were given a bonus for cooperating—making it more
rewarding for them—and led to believe that they alone were receiving this bonus. The
logic here is that prosocial individuals cannot necessarily infer that other people also have
prosocial tendencies. We predicted that only the interdependence manipulation would
sustain cooperation in the public goods game, replicating the results of our prior studies.
Additionally, we predicted that this sustained cooperation would make people feel
interdependent with their group, complementing past research suggesting that
cooperation facilitates the formation of social ties (Sonnemans, van Dijk, van Winden,
2006; van Dijk, Sonnemans, & van Winden, 2002). This would suggest that there is a
bidirectional relationship (or feedback loop) between interdependence and social justice.
Method
Participants. We recruited 299 participants from the University of Massachusetts
Amherst subject pool in exchange for extra credit and prizes (16.5% male; median age of
20). A majority of the participants identified as White (66%), and the remaining
identified as Asian (18.1%), Black (5.5%), Hispanic (3.9%), Multiracial (3.9%), or
nominated another racial category (2.6%). No participants were excluded from analysis.
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A power analysis revealed that this sample had sufficient power (ρ = .80) under realistic
assumptions to detect a medium to small effect of our principal hypothesis (δ = .29) (see
Raudenbush et al., 2011).
Procedure. Similar to Study 3, participants completed the experiment in groups of
three to five people sitting at separated desks facing a wall. We randomly assigned these
groups to one of three experimental manipulations (control, prosocial, or
interdependence) and then participants played the public goods game. Unlike Study 3, the
experimental manipulations were embedded in the detailed directions presented
immediately prior to play. In addition, the experimenter administered a questionnaire
both before and after the game. Points earned in the economic game directly increased
participants’ chances of winning one of several $20, $50, or $100 gift cards. After
answering the post-game measure, participants completed the morality measure and
demographics, including checks on understanding and familiarity18.
Experimental Manipulations. We randomly assigned each group of participants to
the control condition, the prosocial condition, or the interdependence condition. The
prosocial and interdependence manipulations were embedded in the directions for the
public goods game (see Appendix A for manipulations). No additional directions were
provided in the control condition. In the interdependence condition, participants were told
that their payoffs would be shuffled at the end of the game. In the prosocial condition,
participants were told that they alone would receive a bonus to their payoff for every
point they invested in the common pool.
Public Goods Game. We made two small changes to this economic game, but it
was otherwise the same as in Study 3. First, participants played for 15 rounds and did not
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have a practice round. Second, the directions were clarified by providing examples, using
analogies, and simplifying language (see Appendix A for directions).
Pre-Game Measure. We asked participants what they expect the other players in
the economic game to be like. Participants rated a series of adjectives using 7-point scales
anchored from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (7). Prosociality was assessed with
the following five items (α = .877): kind, giving, generous, helpful, and nice.
Interdependence was assessed with the following seven items (α = .746): interdependent
with me, considerate, share my goals, dependable, connected to me, trustworthy, and in
the same “boat” as me.
Post-Game Measure. We asked participants what they thought of the other
players in the economic game. Participants rated a series of adjectives using 7-point
scales anchored from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (7). Prosociality (α = .934)
and interdependence (α = .859) were assessed with the same items as in the pre-game
measure. Using the same rating scale, we also assessed participants’ support for different
distributional principles using four items. These distributional principles were equality,
justice, and equity (r(297) = .725) (see Appendix A for items)19.
Morality Measure. We measured social justice (α = .795) and social order (α =
.674) with the same items used in Study 3.
Results
Public Goods Game
Just as in Study 3, we analyzed the data using hierarchical linear modeling with
full maximum likelihood estimation because the data had a nested structure with three
levels (e.g., observations nested within individuals nested within groups). We first
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calculated the intraclass correlation for contributions to the common pool to assess the
proportion of variance that lies between observations, individuals, and groups as in Study
3. An unconditional model with random intercepts revealed that differences between
observations account for about half of the variance in contributions (49.94%). The next
largest share of variance lies between groups (35.40%) and the smallest share of variance
lies between individuals (14.66%).
Next, we estimated participants’ baseline behavior in the game by including the
round of play (1 – 15) as a level-1 linear predictor with random slopes at both level-2 and
level-3. We also included understanding, familiarity, and group size as covariates20. A
participant in a typical group contributed an estimated 9.90 points (SE = .51, t(72) =
19.44, p < .001) to the common pool in round one, but there was a significant amount of
variation around this intercept at the individual level and the group level (all p < .001).
Contributions then declined over the course of the game (γ = -.18, SE = .041, t(72) = 4.34, p < .001), but there was again significant variation around this slope at the
individual level and the group level (all p < .001).
We then added social justice and social order as grand-mean centered level-2
predictors to test whether these individual differences affect cooperation21. Our analyses
revealed that while social justice was associated with significantly higher initial
contributions to the common pool (γ = .68, SE = .23, t(143) = 2.94, p < .001), it did not
have a significant effect on the rate of contribution decline over time (γ = -.027, SE =
.021, t(143) = -1.31, p = .194). In contrast, social order was associated with significantly
lower initial contributions to the common pool (γ = -.63, SE = .030, t(65) = -2.08, p =
.042) and had a marginally slower rate of contribution decline (γ = .040, SE = .023, t(143)
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= 1.77, p = .079). These individual differences improved model fit (Δχ2(4) = 14.31, p =
.007) and explained a small to moderate amount of the variance in the initial intercept
(7.22%), endgame intercept (0.92%), and slope (4.90%) at level-2.
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Figure 7: Effect of Social Justice on Cooperation.
Before further elaborating on our multilevel model, we conducted one-way
ANOVAs testing for differences between the experimental conditions in both pre-game
interdependence and prosociality pooled across level-2 units; that is, we examined the
average pre-game ratings of groups and not individuals. As predicted, the experimental
conditions differed significantly in their ratings of pre-game interdependence (F(2, 71) =
5.91, p = .004, ηp2 = .143) but not pre-game prosociality (F(2, 71) = .79, p = .458). Posthoc contrasts revealed that ratings of pre-game interdependence were significantly higher
in the interdependence condition (M = 4.93) relative to either the prosocial condition (b =
.39, SE = .11, p < .001) or the control condition (b = .23, SE = .11, p = .049).
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We then added the experimental manipulations as level-3 predictors to test
whether group dynamics affect cooperation (see Appendix C for this model’s equation).
The model revealed that participants’ initial contributions were significantly higher in the
prosocial condition relative to the control condition (γ = 2.39, SE = 1.13, t(70) = 2.12, p =
.037), but were not significantly different in the interdependence condition (γ = .95, SE =
1.11, t(70) = .86, p = .394). In contrast, the decline in contributions over time was
significantly attenuated in the interdependence condition relative to the control condition
(γ = .24, SE = .086, t(70) = 2.80, p = .007), but was not significantly attenuated in the
prosocial condition (γ = .0081, SE = .087, t(70) = .093, p = .926). These experimental
manipulations improved model fit (Δχ2(4) = 13.94, p = .008) and had a bigger effect size,
explaining 7.69% of the variance in the initial intercept, 11.50% of the variance in the
endgame intercept, and 17.88% of the variance in the slope at level-3.
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Figure 8: Effect of the Experimental Manipulations on Cooperation.
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Post-Game Ratings
Next, we reran our baseline model twice—once with giving and once with getting
as the outcome variable22—to estimate and export endgame intercept parameters for each
individual; these parameters summarize the level of cooperation each participant
displayed and experienced respectively at the end of the game. We then conducted a
bootstrapping test of the serial indirect effect with the experimental manipulations (X)
predicting post-game interdependence ratings (Y) mediated through both giving (M1) and
getting (M2)23. Importantly, we controlled for pre-game ratings of interdependence on all
outcomes. This analysis revealed a significant total indirect effect (b = .27, SE = .089,
CI[.118, .469]) and a non-significant direct effect (b = .19, SE = .16, t(298) = 1.19, p =
.237, CI[-.123, .497]) of the interdependence manipulation relative to the control
condition. However, neither the total indirect effect (b = .12, SE = .064, CI[-.003, .250])
nor the direct effect (b = -.021, SE = .15, t(298) = -.13, p = .894, CI[-.322, .281]) were
significant when comparing the prosocial manipulation to the control condition.

Figure 9: Indirect Effect of the Interdependence Manipulation on Post-Game
Interdependence through Cooperation.
Finally, we tested a series of 2-level models in which the outcome was
participants’ rated support for one of the three different distributional principles24. The
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level-1 units were the individuals making the ratings and the level-2 units were the
experimental groups. We added social justice as a level-1 predictor with random effects
and post-game interdependence as a level-2 predictor in each of these models (see
Appendix C for these models’ equations). Both social justice (γ = .26, SE = .091, t(73) =
2.87, p = .005) and post-game interdependence (γ = .30, SE = .12, t(72) = 2.56, p = .013)
were positively associated with support for equality. However, only social justice was
significantly associated with support for justice (γ = .20, SE = .086, t(73) = 2.35, p =
.021) or equity (γ = .19, SE = .086, t(73) = 2.23, p = .029).
Discussion
Replicating Study 3, we again found that the interdependence manipulation
sustained cooperation in the public goods game, but we were also able to show that this
manipulation actually made people feel interdependent with their fellow group members.
This is important because it shows that our experimental manipulation influenced what
we theoretically predicted and not just prosociality. We did not replicate the effects of
social justice on cooperation, finding that individuals who endorse this moral principle
only cooperate more at the beginning of the game. Social justice did however predict the
distributional principles of equality, justice, and equity controlling for feelings of
interdependence; post-game ratings of interdependence only predicted support for
equality. Cohering with these independent effects on the distributional principles, we also
found no evidence of an interaction between individual differences in social justice and
our experimental manipulation of interdependence in the public goods game25.
Most importantly, we found compelling evidence for a feedback loop or virtuous
cycle between interdependence and cooperation; there was a significant indirect effect of
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the interdependence manipulation on post-game interdependence through cooperation
controlling for pre-game interdependence. This finding helps us understand the
emergence of social justice, operationalized as cooperation here. It is not simply that
some precipitating event makes the group feel interdependent and suddenly people
strongly endorse social justice; feelings of interdependence nudge people toward
cooperative action, cooperative action shifts how they feel about the group, and—through
many iterations of this virtuous cycle—social justice as a moral sentiment is nurtured or
grown. Seeing that social justice is embedded in groups is the key to understanding when
and why people care about equality.
A final novel finding involved disentangling giving (i.e., contributions to the
common pool) from getting (i.e., compensation from the common pool) in the public
goods game. Giving represents the level of cooperation each participant chose to display,
while getting represents the level of cooperation each participant experienced. The latter
was outside of participants’ direct control—instead representing the actions of fellow
group members—because we removed the part each participant contributed. We found
that each point contributed was associated with about one point in compensation,
suggesting that it pays to give because it induces others to give in reciprocation.
Interestingly, an inspection of the parameter estimates in our mediational model revealed
that—when controlling for one another’s influence—getting was positively associated
with post-game interdependence while giving was negatively associated. This suggests
that what we get from others, and not just what we do for others, is important in fostering
interdependence in groups. In Study 5, we investigate some of the conditions that could
potentially break this virtuous cycle between interdependence and social justice.
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Notes
18

Most participants were unfamiliar with the public goods game (77.3%) but understood

it (92.2%). This is similar to the rates we found in Study 3.
19

We originally planned to create a composite with the equality and justice items, but

they were only weakly correlated (r(297) = .255, p < .001).
20

We included these variables as covariates, rather than cutting participants, for power

reasons. No random effects were added for any covariates. Covariates were centered so
that the intercepts represented individuals in 4-person groups who understood the game
but were not familiar with it from before. Those familiar with this game contributed
significantly more in the first round (γ = 1.30, SE = .61, t(147) = 2.13, p = .035) but their
contributions declined at a marginally faster rate over the course of the game (γ = -.099,
SE = .054, t(147) = -1.85, p = .066). These covariates did not have any additional
significant effects (all p ≥ .743).
21

We did not include random effects for these variables because they should theoretically

reflect individual differences.
22

Compensation was simply participants’ share of the common pool minus the part they

contributed to the common pool.
23

We used the PROCESS macro to generate bias-corrected bootstrapping 95%

confidence intervals with 20,000 resamples (see Hayes, 2013).
24

As before, we analyzed the data using hierarchical linear modeling with full maximum

likelihood estimation because the data had a nested structure with two levels (e.g.,
individuals nested within groups).
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25

We freed the random effects associated with social justice and added the experimental

manipulations as level-3 predictors of it. Adding these predictors did not improve model
fit (Δχ2(4) = 2.75, p > .500). As can be seen in the graph below, the effect of social justice
on the intercept is somewhat attenuated in the interdependence (γ = -.98, SE = .56, t(71) =
-1.75, p = .085) and prosocial (γ = -.81, SE = .72, t(71) = -1.14, p = .260) conditions
relative to the control condition.
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Figure 10: Effect of Social Justice and Interdependence on Cooperation.
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CHAPTER 6
STUDY 5
Overview
Across four studies, and three very different methodological approaches, we find
consistent evidence for a causal relationship between interdependence and social justice.
In fact, we found evidence for a virtuous cycle between these constructs that helps us
understand the ontogenesis of social justice as a moral sentiment. However, as noted by
one of the participants in the comments section, “economic games are a metaphor for
society.” Even the most equal of societies are more unequal than the average
experimental group in Study 3 (Gini index = .060, SD = .032) or Study 4 (Gini index =
.046, SD = .025)26. This is because the structural design of a typical public goods game—
with every participant receiving the same endowment and the same share of the public
good—strongly pulls for equality. We designed Study 5 to assess the relationship
between interdependence and social justice, but in the context of a structurally unequal
society (or at least experimental group).
The design was similar to Study 4, but participants played an unequal public
goods game in which one rich player received a larger endowment than the other players
(Baseline Gini Index = .25). Past research strongly suggests that unequal endowments
lead to lower levels of cooperation (Anderson, Mellor, & Milyo, 2008; Aquino, Steisel, &
Kay, 1992; Cherry, Kroll, & Shogren, 2005; Colasante & Russo, 2016; Kroll, Cherry, &
Shogren, 2007; Nishi, Shirado, Rand, & Christakis, 2015; Rapoport, Bornstein, & Erev,
1989; Tavoni, Dannenberg, Kallis, & Löschel, 2011). Inequality could potentially break
the virtuous cycle between interdependence and social justice, but we predicted that the
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interdependence manipulation would nonetheless overcome this obstacle and sustain
cooperation in the public goods game—leading to lower levels of inequality.
We also replaced the prosociality condition with a more typical experimental
manipulation of punishment. On the one hand, past research suggests that punishment is
effective at sustaining cooperation (e.g., Fehr & Gächter, 2000, 2002; Ostrom, Walker, &
Gardner, 1992), so we might expect inequality to be attenuated in the punishment
condition (see also Masclet & Villeval, 2008). However, punishment might instead
exacerbate inequality because punishment is associated with lower total payoffs (Dreber,
Rand, Fudenberg, & Nowak, 2008) and the people most likely to engage in punishment
are also the ones who care the most about equality (Johnson, Dawes, Fowler, McElreath,
& Smirnov, 2009). It could also increase inequality if rich and poor players engage in
counter-punishment (e.g., Nikiforakis, 2008) or antisocial punishment (e.g., Rand &
Nowak, 2011) at different rates. For these reasons, we predicted that punishment might
sustain cooperation in the public goods game but would ultimately exacerbate inequality.
Method
Participants. We recruited 328 participants from the University of Massachusetts
Amherst subject pool in exchange for extra credit and prizes (24.1% male; median age of
20). A majority of the participants identified as White (60.1%), and the remaining
identified as Asian (17.4%), Black (5.8%), Hispanic (3.7%), Multiracial (3.7%), or
nominated another racial category (3%). No participants were excluded from analysis. A
power analysis revealed that this sample had sufficient power (ρ = .80) under realistic
assumptions to detect a medium to small effect of our principal hypothesis (δ = .27) (see
Raudenbush et al., 2011).
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Procedure. The procedure was similar to Study 4. Participants completed the
experiment in groups of three to four people sitting at separated desks facing a wall. We
randomly assigned these groups to one of three experimental manipulations (control,
punishment, or interdependence) and the experimenter administered a questionnaire both
before and after the game. Unlike Study 4, we asked each participant to roll a pair of dice
at the beginning of the experiment and to keep the result a secret; the participant with the
highest result was assigned to the role of the wealthy player in an unequal public goods
game, and everyone else was a poor player. Participants played this game for 15 rounds.
After answering the post-game measure, participants completed the justice sensitivity
measure and demographics, including checks on understanding and familiarity27.
Experimental Manipulations. We randomly assigned each group of participants to
the control condition, the punishment condition, or the interdependence condition. The
punishment and interdependence manipulations were embedded in the directions for the
public goods game (see Appendix A for the punishment manipulation). No additional
directions were provided in the control condition. In the interdependence condition,
participants were told that their payoffs would be shuffled at the end of the game just like
in Study 3. In the punishment condition, participants were allowed to sanction other
players at a cost to themselves after each round of play.
Unequal Public Goods Game. In this iteration of the public goods game, one
player receives a larger endowment than the other players do—hence the unequal part of
the name—but it was otherwise similar to the game played in Study 4. The poor players
always received a 10-point endowment in each round; however, the rich player received a
25-point endowment in the 3-person version and a 30-point endowment in the 4-person
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version28. The directions were slightly different for the two types of players, and
explained why one player received a larger endowment than the other players did29. In
the experimental condition with punishment, each round of the game included an extra
phase. This phase allowed players to assign sanction points to one another. Each sanction
point cost one payoff point to assign but destroyed three of the targeted player’s payoff
points30. Participants could see how many sanction points they received, which player
sanctioned them, and the effect of these sanction points on their payoff total.
Pre-Game Measure31. This questionnaire was the same as in Study 4, except we
added the following additional adjectives: moral, righteous, and virtuous. Prosociality (α
= .885), interdependence (α = .735), and morality (α = .822) were all adequately reliable.
We also assessed social justice (α = .827) and social order (α = .583) on this measure
using the same items from Study 3 and Study 4.
Post-Game Measure. This questionnaire was the same as in Study 4, except we
added the following additional adjectives: moral, righteous, and virtuous. Prosociality (α
= .920), interdependence (α = .822), and morality (α = .924) were all adequately reliable.
Using the same rating scale, we also assessed participants’ support for two different
distributional principles using six items. These distributional principles were equality (α
= .722) and equity (α = .760) (see Appendix A for added items).
Justice Sensitivity Measure. This construct was assessed with eight items from an
abbreviated version of the justice sensitivity inventory (Schmitt, Baumert, Gollwitzer, &
Maes, 2010; Baumert et al., 2014). There are four types of justice sensitivity: victim
sensitivity, perpetrator sensitivity, observer sensitivity, and beneficiary sensitivity. Justice
sensitivity was adequately reliable (α = .803) (see Appendix A for items).
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Results
Public Goods Game
As in the prior two studies, we analyzed the data using hierarchical linear
modeling with full maximum likelihood estimation because the data had a nested
structure with three levels (e.g., observations nested within individuals nested within
groups). We first calculated the intraclass correlation for contributions to the common
pool to assess the proportion of variance that lies between observations, individuals, and
groups. An unconditional model with random intercepts revealed that differences
between observations (41.15%) and between individuals (44.53%) accounted for most of
the variance in contributions. Unlike Study 4, we found that the smallest share of
variance lies between groups (14.32%).
Next, we estimated participants’ baseline behavior in the game by including the
round of play (1 – 15) as a level-1 linear predictor with random slopes at both level-2 and
level-3. We also included group size as a level-3 covariate32. A participant in a typical
group contributed an estimated 6.45 points (SE = .34, t(87) = 18.91, p < .001) to the
common pool in round one, but there was a significant amount of variation around this
intercept at the individual level and the group level (all p < .001). Contributions then
declined over the course of the game (γ = -.091, SE = .024, t(87) = -3.81, p < .001), but
there was again significant variation around this slope at the individual level and the
group level (all p < .001).
We then added wealth (rich or poor) as a level-2 predictor with random effects. A
typical poor player contributed an estimated 5.17 points (SE = .27, t(87) = 19.51, p <
.001) to the common pool in round one, whereas a typical rich player initially contributed
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an estimated 9.56 points (SE = .68, t(87) = 14.12, p < .001). Rich and poor players’
trajectories did not otherwise differ (γ = -.025, SE = .053, t(88) = -.47, p = .637).
Although rich players contributed more in absolute terms (γ = 4.40, SE = .59, t(88) =
7.40, p < .001), a rerun of this model with contributions as a proportion of endowment
size revealed that rich players contributed less in relative terms (γ = -.18, SE = .026, t(88)
= 6.73, p < .001). Accounting for wealth improved model fit (Δχ2(2) = 102.69, p < .001)
and explained a substantial amount of the level-2 variance in the initial intercept
(38.26%) and endgame intercept (23.28%), but explained little of the variance in the
slope (0.25%) at level-233.
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Figure 11: Effect of Wealth on Cooperation
Before further elaborating on our multilevel model, we conducted one-way
ANOVAs testing for differences between the experimental conditions in pre-game
interdependence, prosociality, and morality pooled across level-2 units34. As predicted,
the experimental conditions differed significantly in their ratings of both pre-game
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interdependence (F(2, 43) = 5.74, p = .006, ηp2 = .211) and pre-game morality (F(2, 43) =
4.93, p = .012, ηp2 = .187) but not pre-game prosociality (F(2, 43) = 1.07, p = .352). Posthoc contrasts revealed that ratings of pre-game interdependence were significantly higher
in the interdependence condition (M = 4.72) relative to the control condition (b = .52, SE
= .15, p = .002) and marginally higher than the punishment condition (b = .28, SE = .15,
p = .074). Similarly, post-hoc contrasts also revealed that ratings of pre-game morality
were significantly higher in the interdependence condition (M = 4.69) relative to either
the punishment condition (b = .48, SE = .18, p = .009) or the control condition (b = .49,
SE = .18, p = .009).
We then added the experimental manipulations as level-3 predictors to test
whether group dynamics affect cooperation (see Appendix C for this model’s equation)35.
The model revealed that participants’ initial contributions were significantly higher in the
interdependence condition relative to the control condition (γ = 1.51, SE = .56, t(85) =
2.69, p = .009), but were not significantly different in the punishment condition (γ = .51,
SE = .59, t(85) = .91, p = .367). In contrast, the decline in contributions over time was
significantly attenuated in the punishment condition relative to the control condition (γ =
.10, SE = .043, t(85) = 2.39, p = .019), but was not significantly attenuated in the
interdependence condition (γ = -.017, SE = .043, t(85) = -.40, p = .692). These
experimental manipulations improved model fit (Δχ2(4) = 15.92, p = .004) and had a
moderate to large effect size, explaining 12.70% of the variance in the initial intercept,
14.12% of the variance in the endgame intercept, and 19.75% of the variance in the slope
at level-3.
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Figure 12: Effect of the Experimental Manipulations on Cooperation
Next, we calculated a measure of inequality—the Gini index—for each of the
groups in our study (k = 89)36. The groups in this study appeared to be substantially more
unequal (Gini indexS5 = .17, SD = .064) than in our prior studies (Gini indexS3 = .060, SD
= .032; Gini indexS4 = .046, SD = .025). We conducted a one-way ANOVA testing for
differences between the experimental conditions on this Gini index, but there were no
significant differences between the control, punishment, or interdependence conditions in
their level of inequality (F(2, 86) = .27, p = .763).
We also calculated a proportional measure of participants’ contributions to the
common pool that accounts for wealth37. These contributions ultimately determined both
final payoffs and the Gini indices, so we can think of proportional contributions as a
measure of relative influence over the outcome of the game. We tested a general linear
model with these proportional contributions (X) predicting the inequality of each
persons’ group (Y) conditional on wealth (M). Our analyses revealed a significant wealth
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by giving interaction (F(1, 324) = 31.65, p < .001, ηp2 = .089). Poor players could make
the group less unequal by contributing to the common pool (b = -.067, SE = .012, t(324)
= -5.44, p < .001, ηp2 = .084), but this relationship was significantly stronger for rich
players (b = -.15, SE = .026, t(324) = -5.63, p < .001, ηp2 = .089). In other words, rich
players’ behavior was the strongest predictor of each groups’ level of inequality (b = .212, SE = .023, t(324) = -9.34, p < .001, ηp2 = .212).
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Figure 13: Effect of Wealth on Inequality
We wanted to identify the characteristics that predict whether rich players bring
about inequality, so we tested a series of general linear models with wealth, an individual
difference predictor, and their interaction predicting inequality38. Only pre-game
interdependence was associated with inequality. More specifically, there was a significant
wealth by pre-game interdependence interaction (F(1, 169) = 6.02, p = .015, ηp2 = .034);
greater pre-game interdependence predicted lower levels of inequality for rich players (b
= -.023, SE = .009, t(169) = -2.73, p = .007, ηp2 = .042) but not poor players (b = .003, SE
= .006, t(169) = .46, p = .645).
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Post-Game Ratings
Next, we investigated the effect of inequality, the experimental manipulations,
and wealth on post-game ratings of interdependence, prosociality, and morality39. We ran
a series of 2-level hierarchical linear models with all random effects using full maximum
likelihood estimation (see Appendix C for these models’ equations). The level-1 units
were the individuals making the ratings and the level-2 units were the experimental
groups. Across all three models, the only significant predictor was inequality (all other p
≥ .320)40. Members of unequal groups felt less interdependence (γ = -2.92, SE = 1.11,
t(85) = -2.63, p = .010), less prosociality (γ = -4.20, SE = 1.33, t(85) = -3.15, p = .002),
and less morality (γ = -3.27, SE = 1.01, t(85) = -3.24, p = .002) in their groups. Inequality
alone explained 17.65% of the variance in interdependence, 22.89% of the variance in
prosociality, and 25.21% of the variance in morality at level-2.
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Figure 14: Effect of Inequality on Interdependence, Prosociality, and Morality
Finally, we tested the effect of inequality, the experimental manipulations, wealth,
interdependence, and justice sensitivity41 on support for equality and equity using a

61

similar 2-level model with all possible random effects (see Appendix C for these models’
equations). The model revealed that rich players were less supportive of equality than
poor players (γ = -.63, SE = .17, t(75) = -3.66, p < .001). In addition, justice sensitivity
was positively associated with support for both equality (γ = .45, SE = .092, t(75) = 4.92,
p < .001) and equity (γ = .24, SE = .10, t(75) = 2.32, p = .023). None of the remaining
effects reached significance (all p ≥ .147).
Discussion
Although the interdependence manipulation increased contributions to the
common pool, it did not sustain cooperation as we found in Studies 3 and 4. The reason
why, however, was clear from our analyses; rich players contributed less than poor
players in proportion to endowment size. Rich players appeared to feel entitled to their
larger endowment—even though it was literally determined by chance—because they
were less supportive of equality as a distributional principle. The problem is that rich
players exerted the most influence over the outcome of the game. They had the largest
endowment and served as a focal point or correlating device for the other players’
actions. If rich players would not cooperate, nor would the other players and the
inescapable result was heightened inequality. Our most important finding was that
inequality weakened participants’ sense of community; in the face of modest inequality
by real-world standards, they did not feel interdependent and actually thought the other
players were less prosocial and less moral.
The punishment manipulation sustained cooperation, but the costs of punishment
actually decreased payoffs and increased inequality (depending on how you calculate the
Gini index). This might explain why increased rates of cooperation in this condition did
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not translate into greater interdependence. We thought the interdependence manipulation
would still work; after all, there is little incentive to horde one’s wealth if you are
unlikely to keep it. In fact, a game theoretic account would suggest that full cooperation
is a strictly dominant strategy. However, many participants expressed a preference for an
equal division heuristic when describing their strategy in this condition (see Allison &
Messik, 1990). This might reflect a tendency for people to use tacit coordination rules in
strong situations like this (see Kwaadsteniet, van Dijk, Wit, & de Cremer, 2006).
Interestingly, the only characteristic that appeared to induce rich players to bring
about greater equality was pre-game interdependence. Individual differences in justice
sensitivity and social justice were associated with support for equality as a distributional
principle, but they did not have a significant effect on the behavior of rich players. This
finding hints at a potentially important problem; people need to feel interdependent to do
something about inequality, but inequality makes it difficult for them to feel this sense of
interdependence.

Notes
26

The Gini index is a measure of equality bounded between zero (perfect equality) and

one (perfect inequality). The Gini index is the average absolute difference between all
pairs of individuals divided by twice the mean, or equivalently it is twice the area
between the Lorenz curve and the line of perfect equality (Allison, 1978).
27

Most participants were unfamiliar with the public goods game (68.8%) but understood

it (87.8%). This is similar to the rates we found in Study 3 and Study 4. Unfortunately,
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due to a computer malfunction, 49 participants did not have data on demographics,
justice sensitivity, familiarity, or understanding. For this reason, we did not include
familiarity or understanding as covariates in subsequent analyses, and only preliminary
analyses were conducted with justice sensitivity.
28

We adjusted the rich player’s endowment so that there would be 15 points per person

in each version of the game. We tried to recruit only 4-person groups, but this proved to
be extremely difficult—despite overscheduling sessions—because of no-shows.
29

We avoided the terms “rich” and “poor” in the directions, instead using neutral

language around larger and smaller endowments.
30

This ratio is typical in the behavioral economic literature. However, experiments in this

literature typically cap the losses from punishment at zero; we relaxed this assumption
and allowed punishment to produce negative payoffs.
31

Unfortunately, we can only perform preliminary analyses with these items because

47.26% of the data was lost (n = 155); a research assistant took original paper
questionnaires out of the lab to conduct data entry and summarily lost the raw data.
32

Covariates were centered so that the intercepts represented individuals in 3.5-person

groups. None of the effects associated with group size were significant (all p ≥ .379).
33

To calculate these effect size estimates accurately, we excluded the random effects

associated with wealth. Adding these random effects pushes almost all of the level-2
variance to level-3 and further improves model fit (Δχ2(7) = 292.29, p < .001).
34

For this analysis, we used the 46 groups with complete pre-game data.
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35

We also added the experimental manipulations as level-3 predictors of wealth to test

whether they have different effects for rich and poor players. The punishment
manipulation had a significantly stronger effect on the contribution rate of rich players
relative to poor players (γ = .25, SE = .13, t(86) = 2.00, p = .049). However, the
contribution rate in the punishment condition was flat or rather non-significantly different
from zero for both rich players (γ = .13, SE = .099, t(85) = .129, p = .200) and poor
players (γ = .012, SE = .032, t(85) = .37, p = .714). Furthermore, including these
predictors did not improve model fit (Δχ2(4) = 5.02, p = .284).
36

We calculated the Gini index using participants’ final income from the public goods

game. We excluded points lost due to punishment, but find similar results if we include
these lost points in the calculation. The primary difference is that the post-punishment
Gini index reveals even higher levels of inequality in the punishment condition (M = .31)
relative to the control condition (b = .13, SE = .026, p < .001) or the interdependence
condition (b = .14, SE = .026, p < .001). Even though rich players are sanctioned more
than poor players (γ = 1.32, SE = .42, t(87) = 3.16, p = .002), the destruction of wealth
nonetheless yields rich players a larger proportion of all payoff points.
37

We reran our baseline model with round of play (1 – 15) predicting contributions to the

common pool relative to endowment size so we could estimate and export endgame
intercept parameters for each person that represent endgame proportional contributions.
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38

These analyses are somewhat preliminary because of missing data present to varying

degrees in all these individual difference variables: pre-game interdependence, pre-game
prosociality, pre-game morality, social justice, and justice sensitivity.
39

We did not include getting (or giving) as we did in Study 4 because these variables

cause inequality, and thus are highly collinear. To illustrate this, we tested a general
linear model with wealth, giving (group-mean centered), and their interaction predicting
inequality. There was a massive interaction effect (F(1, 324) = 471.24, p < .001, ηp2 =
.593) such that getting predicted greater equality for poor players (b = -.087, SE = .005,
t(324) = -16.93, p < .001, ηp2 = .469) but greater inequality for rich players (b = .057, SE
= .004, t(324) = 13.59, p < .001, ηp2 = .363). Getting still predicts interdependence in this
study (r(326) = .289, p < .001), but poor players get fewer points in unequal groups.
40

However, there was also a marginal effect of wealth such that poor players felt the

other participants were less prosocial (γ = -.29, SE = .16, t(88) = -1.84, p = .069) and
moral (γ = -.27, SE = .15, t(88) = -1.72, p = .089) than rich players did.
41

We used justice sensitivity because it had less missing data, but we find the same

pattern of effects if we instead use social justice as a predictor.
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CHAPTER 7
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Answering the central question of the present research, we found consistent
evidence for a link between interdependence and social justice across different samples
and methodologies. Study 1 revealed that social justice was more important in the groups
of everyday life that are interdependent. Study 2 demonstrated that Americans who feel
interdependent endorse social justice more, and this relationship was even stronger when
we primed their sense of solidarity. Studies 3 and 4 manipulated well-mixed groups’ level
of interdependence, which sustained our operationalization of social justice behavior—
cooperation in a public goods game. Just as Durkheim (1893/1984) predicted more than a
century ago, there is a special connection between interdependence—what he more
formally labeled as organic solidarity—and social justice.
Our experimental manipulation in the economic games simulated interdependence
by giving participants’ shared outcomes, but a more nuanced psychological construction
of interdependence was evident in Study 2. These items emphasized four characteristics
of interdependence based on past work on entitativity (e.g., Brewer, Hong, & Li, 2004),
solidarity (e.g., Durkheim, 1893/1984), and interdependence theory (e.g., Kelley &
Thibaut, 1978): possessing common goals, having shared interests, needing to depend on
one another, and being affected by what happens to each other. Much of our work has
been implicitly couched in social identity theory (e.g., Tajfel et al., 1971), but
interdependence theory gives us a different perspective. “Interdependence theory
analyzes the relations between people in terms of situation structure… [which] is the
interpersonal reality within which cognition, affect, and motivation transpire” (Rusbult &
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Van Lange, 2008, p. 2050). What this emphasis on situation structure makes clear is that
social justice is elicited by particular types of social situations because it solves problems
inherent to these specific interactions (see Carnes et al., 2015; for a taxonomy of situation
structure, see Kelly et al., 2003). That is, social justice makes possible certain patterns of
human social organization that might not otherwise be tractable. An important question
for future research is to identify the situation characteristics that drive different moral
principles.
The consequences of social justice were also highlighted in several of these
studies. In Study 2, we found that social justice predicted support for economic, racial,
and gender equality; in fact, social justice predicted inclusiveness—operationalized as
identification with all of humanity and an expansive circle of moral regard—despite its
seemingly parochial roots in interdependence. However, our potentially most interesting
finding was in Study 4; our analyses suggested that social justice behavior fed back into
group members’ sense of interdependence with others. This suggests there might be a
bidirectional relationship or virtuous cycle between these psychological processes.
This virtuous cycle resolves a lingering question about moral binding. The
original conceptual framework for binding morality proposed by Haidt and colleagues
suggests that some moral principles encourage prosocial behavior indirectly by
motivating people to care about the roles, duties, and obligations of their group (e.g.,
Haidt & Graham, 2009; Haidt & Joseph, 2004; Haidt & Kesebir, 2010). Carnes and
Lickel (under review) formalized this idea with a mediational framework in which
morality (X) shapes prosocial behavior (Y) through identity (M). In the present research,
however, identity (X) generally shapes prosocial behavior (Y) through morality (M).
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These different pathways appear to be incompatible at first glance, but a virtuous cycle or
feedback loop means that both pathways can simultaneously be correct.
Given this virtuous cycle, Study 5 left us with a puzzle. Interdependence appears
to play an important role in fostering the moral convictions that oppose inequality, but
inequality itself undermines perceptions of interdependence. Our interdependence
manipulation did not sustain cooperation in the same way when we exogenously imposed
inequality on experimental groups, and endogenous inequality was associated with less
interdependence, prosociality, and even morality. The breaking of this virtuous cycle is
not certain; American participants in Study 2—who live in an incredibly unequal
society—still exhibited an association between interdependence and social justice.
However, our findings suggest that this cycle may at least weaken as inequality worsens.
One way of understanding how inequality undermines support for equality comes
from the impartiality account of fairness. This account suggests that people prefer
equitable outcomes because humans value impartial actors (DeScioli & Kurzban, 2009)
and distributing resources equitably signals one’s impartiality to others (for a review, see
Shaw, 2013). Both adults (Choshen-Hillel, Shaw, & Caruso, 2015) and children (Shaw,
Choshen-Hillel, & Caruso, 2016; Shaw et al., 2014; Shaw & Olson, 2012, 2014) exhibit a
self-disadvantaging effect that supports the impartiality account. That is, people would
rather destroy a resource than create self-advantaging inequity because they do not want
to appear partial. Perhaps some people oppose equality when they are nested in an
unequal system because an equal distribution of resources would be self-advantaging, and
thus would make them appear to be partial. This might explain why interdependence is so
important for motivating broad support for equality; actions that benefit the self also
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benefit other group members—and vice versa—in an interdependent group, so concerns
about appearing partial or impartial are alleviated.
Putting the present research back into the historical context of progressive
taxation and policy, our work suggests that there might be nothing particularly special
about mass mobilization for warfare in inducing support for equality (see Scheve &
Stasavage, 2016). Mass mobilization might have yielded support for social justice
because people felt a renewed sense of interdependence. If some other mass event—like
climate change or globalization—makes people feel interdependent, then those events
should yield support for social justice as well. Based on the findings of Study 5, whether
these events actually make people feel interdependent may critically depend on the
inequality of our economic system.
Many media outlets have noted how the rise of right-wing populism in America
and elsewhere was fueled by the downtrodden—those left behind by outsourcing or
automation—so perhaps this work sheds a new light on a contemporary problem.
Downtrodden communities should not feel interdependent because they have been left
behind by radical inequality. Considering the link between interdependence and
inclusion, it should come as no surprise that they oppose the “others.” People of a
different race, people of a different religion, people of a different political party,
homosexual people, immigrants, and refugees—these groups were all represented in our
measure of inclusion in Study 2, and these are the “others” in public debate. Furthermore,
if this political coalition does not feel interdependent, then it is also predictable that they
would oppose engines of interdependence; climate change, globalization, and
government all make us more interdependent—they have collective benefits and costs—
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but people with a depleted sense of interdependence might feel dissonance between how
they feel and what they hear from scientists or policymakers. So they ignore what they
hear, instead trusting what they feel, and attack the partiality of disadvantaged groups
advocating for equality.
We learned about more than social justice in the present research; our findings
also implicate social order. Study 1 revealed that social order was more important in the
groups of everyday life that have strong norms and low tolerance for deviant behavior
(i.e., tightness-looseness). Study 2 demonstrated that Americans who feel a visceral sense
of oneness with the group (i.e., identity fusion) endorse social order more, and this
relationship was even stronger when we primed their sense of solidarity. Finally, Study 3
manipulated the norms in well-mixed groups, which initiated our operationalization of
social order behavior—coordination in a matching game. These findings, particularly
those of Study 2, are consistent with past research on moral binding (see Carnes &
Lickel, under review). Taken together with our social justice findings, this work suggests
that there are at least two distinct types of moral binding. These two types of binding
correspond remarkably well with Durkheim’s (1893/1984) conception of organic
solidarity and mechanical solidarity.
Turning to politics, Graham, Haidt, and Nosek (2009) argue that political
conservatives rely on a more diverse set of moral principles than liberals (for a review,
see Haidt, 2012); liberals endorse only the individualizing moral principles of care/harm
and fairness/cheating, while conservatives also endorse the binding moral principles of
loyalty/betrayal, authority/subversion, and purity/degradation. Janoff-Bulman and Carnes
(2013) assert that this imbalance results from an incomplete map of the moral domain
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rather than something intrinsically less groupish about the moral psychology of liberals.
That is, social justice is the group-based moral principle representing the concerns of
liberals not represented by Moral Foundations Theory. Perhaps unsurprisingly, Graham
(2013) disagrees with this assessment. The present research provides compelling
evidence that social justice is indeed group-based and has a binding effect of its own.
The present research was illuminating, but it also had its limitations. First, as
might be expected on a project spanning three years, there were some inconsistencies in
measurement between studies. This could, however, be construed as a strength
considering that we found consistent results regardless of measurement differences.
Second, we also had some data problems, particularly in Study 5, due to research
assistants departing from lab protocol. This is regrettable, but one potential remediation
would be to use multilevel multiple imputation to replace the missing data (see Enders,
Mistler, & Keller, 2016). A third problem we encountered in Studies 4 and 5 involved
how to predict group-level dependent variables with individual-level independent
variables. This is because hierarchical linear modeling only uses group-level data as
predictors. Our solution was to treat group-level data as individual-level data, but this is
not ideal. In the future, we could solve this problem by reanalyzing the data using
multilevel structural equation modeling with latent growth curves. A fourth limitation
was that all of our data was collected in a single cultural context (i.e., American
participants). Although such samples are the norm in psychological research, these
WEIRD cultures (i.e., Western, educated, industrialized, rich, and democratic) are in fact
only a narrow slice of the cultural variation seen in human societies (Henrich, Heine, &
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Norenzayan, 2010). Collected data from non-WEIRD cultural contexts could help resolve
this final problem.
There are many potential future directions for this work. Some questions are more
applied, like understanding the effects of climate change, globalization, or inequality on
public opinion. Others are more oriented around understanding psychological process,
such as how inequality undermines interdependence or how the virtuous cycle works.
There are also clear links to other theoretical accounts (e.g., interdependence theory, the
impartiality account of fairness, moral foundations theory) that could benefit from
conceptual integration. President Barack Obama called inequality the defining issue of
our time, so our hope is that whatever course this work takes will help ameliorate a
generation-defining problem.
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APPENDIX A
MATERIALS
Study 1
1. Interdependence 1: In some groups, members can depend on each other no matter
what, whereas members of other groups don’t depend on each other at all. How much
can members of the following groups depend on one another?
2. Interdependence 2: Members of some groups are strongly affected when something,
good or bad, happens to other people in the group, while members of other groups are
weakly affected. How strongly affected are members of the following groups by what
happens to other people in the group?
3. Interdependence 3: Most groups have common goals that their members want to
attain. Members of some groups need each other in order to attain these goals,
whereas members of other groups don't really need one another at all. How much do
members of the following groups need each other?
4. Tightness 1: Most groups have norms or informal rules to guide behavior. Some
groups have very strong norms that members must comply with, while other groups
have very weak norms that members can choose whether or not to follow. How
strong are the norms in the following groups?
5. Tightness 2: In some groups, members are strictly punished for failing to conform to
the rest of the group, whereas members of other groups are never punished for acting
differently. How strictly are members of the following groups punished if they don't
conform and act differently?
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6. Tightness 3: Most groups have norms or informal rules to guide behavior. Some
groups have very many norms for members to follow, whereas other groups have
very few norms for members to follow. How many norms are there for members of
the following groups to adhere to?
7. Social Justice 1: In some groups, members have a responsibility to help the neediest
members of their group, while members of other groups have no such responsibility.
How important is it for members of the following groups to help their neediest
members?
8. Social Justice 2: Members of some groups are expected to share what they can with
other members, whereas members of other groups don't need to share with each other
at all. How important is it for members of the following groups to share with one
another?
9. Social Justice 3: In some groups, members care very much about the well-being of
others simply because of their shared group membership, whereas in other groups
members may not care much at all unless they have a personal relationship with
someone. How much do members of the following groups care about the well-being
of other group members?
10. Social Order 1: Most groups have some kind of hierarchy or social ladder. In some
groups, the social ladder is very steep with big differences between those at the top
and bottom, while the social ladder is very flat in other groups with almost no
difference between those at the top and bottom. How steep is the social ladder in the
following groups?
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11. Social Order 2: Most groups have traditions and customs of some kind. Some groups
have more elaborate or complex traditions, whereas other groups have plainer or
simpler customs. How complex are the traditions and customs in the following
groups?
12. Social Order 3: Most groups have both leaders and followers. In some groups,
leaders will frequently tell followers what to do and what not to do, while leaders in
other groups will rarely offer such guidance. How often do leaders in the following
groups tell followers what to do?
Study 2
1. Interdependence 1: There is a common thread that connects the hopes and dreams of
Americans.
2. Interdependence 2: There are common goals that unite us as Americans.
3. Interdependence 3: Despite our differences, we have fundamentally shared interests
as Americans.
4. Interdependence 4: I feel interdependent with my fellow Americans no matter our
divisions.
5. Interdependence 5: We, the American people, are all in this together.
6. Interdependence 6: We have to depend on each other, no matter what, because we
are all Americans.
7. Interdependence 7: It affects me when something, good or bad, happens to other
Americans.
8. Interdependence 8: My well-being is tied to the well-being of every other American.
9. Identity Fusion 1: My country is me.
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10. Identity Fusion 2: I feel immersed in my country.
11. Identity Fusion 3: I make my country strong.
12. Identity Fusion 4: I am nothing without my country.
13. Identity Fusion 5: I am strong because of my country.
14. Identity Fusion 6: I am one with my country.
15. Identity Fusion 7: I’ll do for my country more than any other group member would
do.
16. Identity Fusion 8: I have a deep emotional bond with my country.
17. Social Justice 1: It’s our responsibility, not just a matter of personal preference, to
provide for those worst off in American society.
18. Social Justice 2: Future generations should judge our society by how we treat those
Americans most desperate for help.
19. Social Justice 3: It is important for those who are better off to share with the most
vulnerable members of society.
20. Social Justice 4: Americans should feel like it is their duty to care for each other no
matter what.
21. Social Justice 5: If we want to be a just society, Americans at the top must feel an
obligation to improve the well-being of those at the bottom.
22. Social Justice 6: As Americans, we have a responsibility to look out for one another.
23. Social Order 1: Americans should show respect for a group member who has
authority.
24. Social Order 2: Americans should be loyal no matter what the cost.
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25. Social Order 3: If you live here, you should try to fit in with our values and
practices.
26. Social Order 4: Americans should honor our group’s heritage and history.
27. Social Order 5: There are good reasons why our traditions have lasted for so long.
28. Social Order 6: American is made stronger when its rules and leaders are faithfully
followed.
29. Equality 1: Increasing equality is ultimately beneficial to everyone in society.
30. Equality 2: The gap between the “haves” and “have nots” is too big.
31. Equality 3: American should be a fairer place for the 99%.
32. Equality 4: Inequality has a harmful effect on our country.
Study 3
1. Norm Manipulation: I want you to imagine that you are all in a group with norms or
informal rules about how players should behave in these economic games. The norm
or informal rule in your group is that players should (pick the number 4/choose to
contribute all of their endowment) while playing the (Matching game/Common Pool
game). There is no punishment for violating this rule, but it tells you what most
people should do in the game.
2. Interdependence Manipulation: I want you to imagine a scenario in which you have
no idea how well you are going to do in this game, or how many points you are going
to have, relative to the other players; how would you want points to be distributed
among the (3/4/5) players in the group, so that you have relatively similar outcomes
or dissimilar outcomes? You should keep this question in mind, because there is an
unusual twist at the end of the game; I’m going to randomly shuffle your payoffs at
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the end of the experiment so that you are just as likely to get someone else’s payoffs
as your own. In other words, there is only a (33%/25%/20%) chance that you will
keep your own payoff rather than taking another player’s payoff.
3. Social Justice 1: It is our responsibility, not just a matter of personal preference, to
provide for groups worse off in society.
4. Social Justice 2: It is important in a just society for those who are better of to share
what resources they can with the most vulnerable members.
5. Social Justice 3: In the healthiest societies, those at the top should feel responsible
for improving the well-being of those at the bottom.
6. Social Justice 4: Looking out for groups worst off in society will not make those
groups too dependent on help.
7. Social Justice 5: Increased economic equality is ultimately beneficial to everyone in
society.
8. Social Order 1: In order for society to be stable, there has to be agreement about
what behaviors and ways of life are appropriate.
9. Social Order 2: It is harmful to society when people choose radically different
beliefs and assumptions about the world.
10. Social Order 3: There are often good reasons why traditions have lasted for so long,
even if people do not fully understand those reasons.
11. Social Order 4: In the most decent societies, people should try to fit in and respect
the values and practices of the larger community.
12. Social Order 5: Society is made stronger when its rules and leaders are faithfully
followed.
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Study 4
1. Interdependence Manipulation: Normally, players just keep the points they earned
in the 15 rounds of the Common Pool Game. However, your group will have a
different payoff system. At the end of the experiment, we're going to randomly assign
each player's payoff to one of the (3/4/5) players in the game. Here's an explanation
of how this payoff system works. Imagine that you earned 375 points in the Common
Pool Game and then wrote that number on a card. Suppose the other players also
wrote how many points they earned on cards. If I shuffled those cards and then
randomly handed each player a card, you might get the card with your 375 points, but
it is more likely that you will get a card with another player's points written on it. As
you can see, there is only a (33%/25%20%) chance that you will keep your original
payoff, and a (66%/75%/80%) chance that you will get someone else's payoff! This
different payoff system means that how well you actually do in the game depends
much more on how many points the other players have, and much less on how many
points you personally have.
2. Prosocial Manipulation: Normally, players just keep the points they earned in the 15
rounds of the Common Pool Game. However, you personally will have a different
payoff system. At the end of the experiment, we're going to increase the size of your
payoff based on how much you usually contributed to the common pool. Here's an
explanation of how this payoff system works. If you contributed an average of 5
points to the common pool, then we'll increase the size of your payoff by 5%. If you
contributed an average of 10 points to the common pool, then we'll increase the size
of your payoffs by 10%. And if you contributed an average of 15 points to the
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common pool, then we'll increase the size of your payoffs by 15%. As you can see,
the more you share with the other players, the more we'll increase the size of your
payoff! This different payoff system means that you actually benefit much more than
normal from contributing your points to the common pool.
3. Public Goods Game Directions: The Common Pool Game is an example of a
generic situation in which a group of people want to achieve a common goal, but
everyone in the group has the option of free-riding on the others' efforts. You are
going to play 15 rounds of this game for points; there will not be any practice rounds.
At the beginning of each round, you will receive an endowment of 20 points. You can
think of the endowment as an allowance you receive every round. Your task in each
round is to decide how much of your endowment, if any, you would like to contribute
to the common pool, and how much of your remaining endowment, if any, you would
like to keep for yourself. The other players will not know how much you personally
contributed to the common pool, but they will know how much was contributed to the
common pool in general. At the end of each round, we will increase the number of
points in the common pool by 60%. In contrast, the points you kept for yourself will
not be increased at all. Finally, the common pool will be divided evenly between all
of the players in the game. In other words, each player in the game gets an equal
share of the common pool no matter how much or how little they contributed. This
means that the group as a whole can earn the most points when everyone contributes
to the common pool, but individuals can earn the most points when they free-ride on
others' contributions. Your payoff from each round will be equal to the number of
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points you kept for yourself plus your share of the points in the common pool. Your
payoff is what will determine your likelihood of winning a gift card in the raffle.
4. Equality: The points should have been divided pretty equally among the players.
5. Justice: The players who got the fewest points should have gotten more points than
they did.
6. Equity 1: The players who contributed the least to the common pool should have
gotten fewer points.
7. Equity 2: The players who contributed the most to the common pool should have
gotten more points.
Study 5
1. Punishment Manipulation: Normally, players just keep the points they earned in
each round of the Common Pool Game. However, the players in your group will be
able to sanction each other at the end of each round. At the end of each round, you
may assign sanction points to the other players if you want to (but you do not have
to). Here's an explanation of how this sanctioning system works. It costs you one
point from your payoff to assign a sanction point to another player, but that player
will then lose three points from their payoff. You may assign as many sanction points
as you have points in your initial endowment. For example, if you have a ten point
endowment, you may assign up to ten sanction points per round. It is possible to
receive negative points because of this sanctioning. Players will find out who
sanctioned them (although you will still only be identified by a player number). You
can assign sanction points for any reason you want, just remember that other players
can sanction you back (and you can sanction them back).
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2. Equality 3: The players who got the most points should have gotten fewer points
than they did.
3. Equity 3: It would be fairer if inputs to the common pool were proportional to
outputs.
4. Victim Sensitivity 1: It makes me angry when others are undeservingly better off
than me.
5. Victim Sensitivity 2: It worries me when I have to work hard for things that come
easily to others.
6. Beneficiary Sensitivity 1: I feel guilty when I am better off than others for no reason.
7. Beneficiary Sensitivity 2: It bothers me when things come easily to me that others
have to work hard for.
8. Observer Sensitivity 1: I am upset when someone is undeservingly worse off than
others.
9. Observer Sensitivity 2: It worries me when someone has to work hard for things that
come easily to others.
10. Perpetrator Sensitivity 1: I feel guilty when I enrich myself at the cost of others.
11. Perpetrator Sensitivity 2: It bothers me when I use tricks to achieve something
while others have to struggle for it.
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APPENDIX B
TABLES
Table 1: Model Comparisons (Excluding Non-Significant Alternative Models)
Model
χ2
df
Δχ2
Δdf
p-value
Fully Constrained
879.26
333
Baseline Model
Added Paths from Group
840.19
331
39.07
2
< .001
Dynamics to Morality
Partially Variant
778.50
314
61.69
17
< .001
Measurement
Variant Paths from Group
748.37
306
30.13
8
< .001
Dynamics to Morality
Note. Each model is compared to the prior model in the table.
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Table 2: Factor Parameter Estimates for Final Model
Strong Solidarity Condition
Parameter
b
SE
t
p
β
Interdependence → Justice
.876
.098
8.91
< .001
.674
Fusion → Order
.795
.058
13.80
< .001
.771
Interdependence ↔ Fusion
.627
.078
8.02
< .001
.646
Justice ↔ Order
-.286
.055
-5.18
< .001
-.220
Justice Disturbance
.777
.082
9.51
< .001
.723
Order Disturbance
.653
.077
8.50
< .001
.416
Weak Solidarity Condition
b
SE
t
p
β
Interdependence → Justice
.428
.074
5.77
< .001
.425
Fusion → Order
.686
.055
12.40
< .001
.732
Interdependence ↔ Fusion
.780
.099
7.92
< .001
.599
Justice ↔ Order
-.277
.058
-4.80
< .001
-.225
Justice Disturbance
.872
.088
9.92
< .001
.872
Order Disturbance
.719
.080
8.94
< .001
.476
Both Conditions
b
SE
t
p
β
Fusion → Justice
-.276
.045
-6.16
< .001
-.323
Interdependence → Order
-.017
.062
-.28
.779
-.011
Justice → Equality
.682
.039
17.30
< .001
.698
Justice → Inclusion
.472
.043
10.87
< .001
.609
Order → Equality
-.291
.031
-9.45
< .001
-.359
Order → Inclusion
-.120
.030
-4.05
< .001
-.188
Equality ↔ Inclusion
.024
.029
.83
.407
.029
Equality Disturbance
.323
.057
5.71
< .001
.303
Inclusion Disturbance
.363
.054
6.77
< .001
.558
Note. The → indicates a path; the ↔ indicates an exogenous or disturbance covariance.
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Table 3: Indicator Parameter Estimates, Reliability, and Validity for Final Model
Strong Solidarity Condition
Parameter
Factor
Error
Reliability
Validity
Loading
Variance
Interdependence 1
1
.469
.575
.765
Interdependence 2
1.28
.585
.642
.805
Interdependence 3
1.27
.457
.693
.836
Interdependence 4
1.13
.638
.558
.756
Social Justice 1
1
.215
.838
.901
Social Justice 2
1.00
.157
.875
.923
Social Justice 3
1.02
.442
.719
.843
Equality Self-Report
1
.496
.685
.808
Gini Index
-.103
.048
.193
.428
Disparity Rating Task
.212
.165
.223
.466
Weak Solidarity Condition
Factor
Error
Reliability
Validity
Loading
Variance
Interdependence 1
1
.504
.662
.813
Interdependence 2
1.02
.578
.641
.799
Interdependence 3
1.14
.541
.704
.838
Interdependence 4
.770
.929
.386
.622
Social Justice 1
1
.222
.815
.914
Social Justice 2
1.06
.389
.738
.869
Social Justice 3
1.12
.331
.789
.894
Equality Self-Report
1
.456
.692
.848
Gini Index
-.152
.034
.413
.652
Disparity Rating Task
.212
.162
.224
.479
Both Conditions
Factor
Error
Reliability
Validity
Loading
Variance
Identity Fusion 1
1
.417
.793
.891
Identity Fusion 2
1.05
.856
.674
.820
Identity Fusion 3
1.02
.488
.773
.881
Identity Fusion 4
1.03
.555
.753
.869
Social Order 1
1
.411
.789
.888
Social Order 2
1.03
.623
.724
.850
Social Order 3
1.09
.706
.723
.847
Moral Expansiveness
1
.762
.460
.678
Identify With All Humanity
.801
.331
.557
.746
Note. All factor loadings and error variances are unstandardized. Reliability is true
variance divided by observed variance. Validity is the indicator-factor correlation.
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APPENDIX C
EQUATIONS
Study 3
Public Goods Game
Contributiontij = π0ij + π1ij*(Linear Roundtij) + etij
π0ij = β00j + β01j*(Social Justiceij) + β02j*(Social Orderij) + β03j*(Familiarij)
+ β04j*(Understandij) + r0ij
π1ij = β10j + β11j*(Social Justiceij) + β12j*(Social Orderij) + β13j*(Familiarij)
+ β14j*(Understandij) + r1ij
π2ij = β20j + β21j*(Social Justiceij) + β22j*(Social Orderij) + β23j*(Familiarij)
+ β24j*(Understandij) + r2ij
β00j = γ000 + γ001(Normj) + γ002(Interdependencej) + γ003(Sizej) + u00j
β01j = γ010
β02j = γ020
β03j = γ030
β04j = γ040
β10j = γ100 + γ101(Normj) + γ102(Interdependencej) + γ103(Sizej) + u10j
β11j = γ110
β12j = γ120
β13j = γ130
β14j = γ140
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Matching Game
Prob(Matchijk=1|πjk) = ϕijk
log[ϕijk/(1 - ϕijk)] = ηijk
ηijk = π0jk + π1jk*(Roundijk)
π0jk = β00k + β01k*(Social Justicejk) + β02k*(Social Orderjk) + β03k*(Understandjk)
+ β04k*(Familiarjk) + r0jk
π1jk = β10k + β11k*(Social Justicejk) + β12k*(Social Orderjk) + β13k*(Understandjk)
+ β14k*(Familiarjk) + r1jk
β00k = γ000 + γ001(Interdependencek) + γ002(Normk) + γ003(Sizek) + u00k
β01k = γ010
β02k = γ020
β03k = γ030
β04k = γ040
β10k = γ100 + γ101(Interdependencek) + γ102(Normk) + γ103(Sizek) + u10k
β11k = γ110
β12k = γ120
β13k = γ130
β14k = γ140
Study 4
Public Goods Game
Contributiontij = π0ij + π1ij*(Linear Roundtij) + etij
π0ij = β00j + β01j*(Social Justiceij) + β02j*(Social Orderij) + β03j*(Familiarij)
+ β04j*(Understandij) + r0ij
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π1ij = β10j + β11j*(Social Justiceij) + β12j*(Social Orderij) + β13j*(Familiarij)
+ β14j*(Understandij) + r1ij
β00j = γ000 + γ001(Prosocialj) + γ002(Interdependencej) + γ003(Sizej) + u00j
β01j = γ010
β02j = γ020
β03j = γ030
β04j = γ040
β10j = γ100 + γ101(Prosocialj) + γ102(Interdependencej) + γ103(Sizej) + u10j
β11j = γ110
β12j = γ120
β13j = γ130
β14j = γ140
Post-Game Ratings
Equalityij = β0j + β1j*(Social Justiceij) + rij
β0j = γ00 + γ01*(Interdependencej) + u0j
β1j = γ10 + u1j
Justiceij = β0j + β1j*(Social Justiceij) + rij
β0j = γ00 + γ01*(Interdependencej) + u0j
β1j = γ10 + u1j
Equityij = β0j + β1j*(Social Justiceij) + rij
β0j = γ00 + γ01*(Interdependencej) + u0j
β1j = γ10 + u1j
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Study 5
Public Goods Game
Contributiontij = π0ij + π1ij*(Linear Roundtij) + etij
π0ij = β00j + β01j*(Wealthij) + r0ij
π1ij = β10j + β11j*(Wealthij) + r1ij
β00j = γ000 + γ001(Sizej) + γ002(Interdependencej) + γ003(Punishmentj) + u00j
β01j = γ010 + u01j
β10j = γ100 + γ101(Sizej) + γ102(Interdependencej) + γ103(Punishmentj) + u10j
β11j = γ110 + u11j
Post-Game Ratings
Interdependentti = π0i + π1i*(Wealthti) + eti
π0i = β00 + β01*(Interdependencei) + β02*(Punishmenti) + β03*(Inequalityi) + r0i
π1i = β10 + r1i
Prosocialityti = π0i + π1i*(Wealthti) + eti
π0i = β00 + β01*(Interdependencei) + β02*(Punishmenti) + β03*(Inequalityi) + r0i
π1i = β10 + r1i
Moralityti = π0i + π1i*(Wealthti) + eti
π0i = β00 + β01*(Interdependencei) + β02*(Punishmenti) + β03*(Inequalityi) + r0i
π1i = β10 + r1i
Equalityti = π0i + π1i*(Wealthti) + π2i*(Interdependentti) + π3i*(Justice Sensitivityti) + eti
π0i = β00 + β01*(Interdependencei) + β02*(Punishmenti) + β03*(Inequalityi) + r0i
π1i = β10 + r1i
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π2i = β20 + r2i
π3i = β30 + r3i
Equalityti = π0i + π1i*(Wealthti) + π2i*(Interdependentti) + π3i*(Justice Sensitivityti) + eti
π0i = β00 + β01*(Interdependencei) + β02*(Punishmenti) + β03*(Inequalityi) + r0i
π1i = β10 + r1i
π2i = β20 + r2i
π3i = β30 + r3i
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